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Abstract
This report seeks to draw out the common characteristics of frauds associated with pandemics, 
and to identify any risks unique to pandemics and financial crises, beginning with the Spanish 
flu pandemic of 1918, as the closest to COVID-19 in the modern era. It summarises the general 
influence of the internet or remote intrusions on contemporary frauds and allied corporate/
organised crimes against individuals, businesses and government, using plausibly reliable data 
from Australia and the United Kingdom as indicative of more general trends. The report 
identifies some novel crime types and methodologies arising during the COVID-19 pandemic of 
2020 that were not seen in previous pandemics. These changes may result from public health 
measures taken in response to COVID-19, the current state of technologies and the activities of 
law enforcement and regulatory guardians. The report notes that many frauds occur whatever 
the state of the economy, but that some specific frauds occur during pandemics, especially 
online fraud. Similarly, some previously occurring frauds are revealed by economic crises, while 
frauds arising from and causing insolvencies are stimulated by economic crises. The report 
concludes with a discussion of the policy implications for prevention, resilience and for private 
and public policing and criminal justice in Australia. It stresses the need for plans for future 
pandemics and economic crises to include provisions for better early monitoring and control of 
fraud and procurement corruption.
vii
Executive summary
This review begins with a very brief rationale for the selection of particular pandemics and 
other major social and economic crises since the First World War, beginning with the Spanish 
flu pandemic of 1918, as the crisis most similar to the COVID-19 pandemic in the modern era, 
and including the influenza pandemics of 1957 and 1968. It includes other major economic 
shocks such as the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and the 
global financial crisis of 2008–09. The study seeks to draw out the common characteristics of 
frauds associated with pandemics, and to identify any risks unique to pandemics and financial 
crises, and to assess the general influence of the internet and remote intrusions on 
contemporary frauds and allied corporate or organised crimes against individuals, businesses 
and government, using data from Australia and the United Kingdom as indicative of more 
general trends.
Some trend analysis using officially recorded fraud data from the United Kingdom and 
Australia—and any recent data on payment card fraud or from business surveys—will chart 
how recorded crime changed following previous shocks and pandemics. Where possible, these 
crime trends are mapped to business activity levels. The report explores what we can learn 
about the responses of individuals and organised crime to specific initiatives and other 
activities. These include: social distancing, loan/mortgage repayment freezes, pensioner cash 
payments, limiting cash payments in favour of contactless payments, profiteering from the sale 
of health products, social welfare fraud, identity misuse, IT fraud arising from data 
manipulation and phone plans, corporate fraud or phoenixing, payroll fraud, employee wage 
theft or dishonest underpayment of staff, consumer scams, insurance fraud and contractual 
dishonesty in non-repayment of deposits on bookings or failure to repay government-
guaranteed loans.
We seek to identify any novel crime types or methodologies not seen during previous 
pandemics that have arisen during the COVID-19 pandemic, perhaps because of specific 
economic and public health measures. By necessity, this will not be an extensive review of 
those issues, but will canvass the problems and solutions in a concise and practical way. Many 
frauds occur regardless of health or economic crises, but some specific frauds, especially online 
frauds, occur in response to the circumstances involving pandemics. Similarly, some frauds that 
were previously occurring are revealed by economic crises, while frauds arising from 
insolvencies are stimulated by economic crises. Some substantial procurement and loans 
frauds against government are likely outcomes of pressures to buy health products rapidly and 
to encourage banks to lend to businesses.
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The report reviews existing projections of changes in online and offline economic crimes. It 
analyses how fraud and economic crime may plausibly change by June 2022 as a result of the 
coronavirus pandemic, via expected socio-economic impacts and changes in motivation, 
opportunities and guardianship capabilities. It concludes with a discussion of the policy 
implications for prevention, for building resilience and for private and public policing and 
criminal justice responses, focusing on Australia. Whatever the need for improvement of 
policing and prosecution to enhance legitimacy in the eyes of the public and to deter crime, the 
report stresses that plans for future pandemics and economic crises must include provisions for 
better monitoring and control of fraud. The faster that loans are monitored and controlled, the 
less will be lost to fraud. To achieve this, greater transparency and accountability are needed in 





There are many and diverse forms of economic crime, some of which have a prima facie 
connection to pandemics and economic crises and others of which may not. The plausible 
direction of causality is important to consider. Do frauds exacerbate or even lead to economic 
crises? Do such crises generate opportunities for fraud, and do they always do so, or are these 
risks connected to specific initiatives developed in response to crises? Are the offenders in 
these contexts the same ones who commit frauds at other times, or are there new entrants 
into the criminal markets? How does the behaviour of past and potential victims—whether 
individual, corporate or governmental—change during such times? Or are pandemics and 
economic crises largely or even only a hook on which to hang scams that might well have been 
perpetrated anyway? Is the health and economic crisis of 2020 so unlike previous ones that it is 
foolish to seek parallels, which are likely to be modest at best? What lessons have been 
learned, or not learned, from previous crises?
Contemporary discussions invariably show some awareness of the problem of non-reporting as 
well as non-prosecution of fraud. Existing data need to be considered within the context of the 
elapsed time to detection (which can be infinite if undetected or misidentified as ‘not fraud’), 
and to formal intervention, whether regulatory or criminal; this will vary by type. Large internal 
frauds and corruption usually take longer to surface and also to investigate and prosecute. 
Since we will be reviewing frauds over the last century, focusing on the United Kingdom and 
Australia, there have been many changes in reporting, recording and processing them, in 
addition to the technological changes in fraud commission, prevention and pursuit as we move 
from the telegraph to cyberspace and cryptocurrencies as mechanisms for funds transmission, 
and from the biblical apple to Apple as mechanisms of temptation.
There are a number of perspectives from which this could be analysed:
• examining a set of ‘known frauds’ by subtype and seeing whether their commission and 
their exposure are related to pandemics and economic crises.
• examining periods of pandemic and economic crises and analysing what sorts of frauds and 
other economic crimes are known to have occurred then, to try to calculate some 
equivalent of ‘excess deaths’ for economic crimes.
It is important to consider if changes in monitoring and policing or regulatory responses might 
be responsible for any changes in official data, and therefore whether changes in reported or 
recorded ‘fraud rates’ may be an artefact of increased or reduced reporting and willingness to 
act rather than reflecting a real change in fraudulent behaviour.
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Despite some level of regional and international harmonisation, we cannot assume that 
criminalisation of ‘economic crimes’ or fraud is universal and unchanging over time. For 
example, price gouging is not criminal everywhere, although it is a federal crime in the United 
States (see King & Spalding LLP 2020). In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets 
Authority (2020) has displayed a leisurely approach to the regulation of price increases, while 
in Australia regulators can deal with price gouging as a form of unconscionable conduct in 
some jurisdictions (eg Queensland Government 2020). Elsewhere price gouging may be dealt 
with administratively if at all, and in a profit-driven economy there is legal and indeed ethical 
debate about the threshold for defining price setting as ‘gouging’ (see, for example, the 
fascinating discussion of the criteria for ‘profiteering’ in the parliamentary debate on what 
became the UK Profiteering Act 1919; House of Commons 1919).
Also relevant to the scope of illegal activity during pandemics is the question of whether or not 
the category of fraud or ‘product counterfeiting’ includes homeopathic and prescription ‘cures’ 
for which there is no good scientific evidence according to the standards of the day. When, for 
example, do scientifically unproven claims about the alleviating effect of ‘healthy products’ 
become deceptions sufficient to be included in the category of economic crimes, and does this 
classification as fraud require proof of intent or recklessness? In the United States, one 
organisation reviewed the research on vaccines and drugs used in previous pandemics, before 
praising the preventative qualities of honey, noting that ‘natural products can only ease the 
symptoms and support your own immune system’ and that readers should ‘avoid coronavirus 
scams!’ (Healthy with Honey 2020). Crime features only intermittently in classical accounts of 
the causes of economic crises, and barely at all in accounts of pandemics (eg Zinsser 2000). 
Although corruption in international aid to the Global South commonly features in the 
development literature, it is only intermittently linked to pandemics or indeed to economic 
crises. In his analysis of the Black Death in Naples in 1656, Snowden refers to:
…the breakdown of law and order and the collapse of every public service 
including instances of fraud and profiteering: astrologers peddled advice 
and prognostications, charlatans hawked their nostrums, and healers of 
every description charged astonishing sums for practising their arts. 
(Snowden 2020: 59–60)
None of the major books on the Spanish flu epidemic discusses frauds, and corruption is 
mentioned only in the metaphorical or spiritual sense. Consideration will be given to the 
evidence on black marketeering and other crimes in wartime later, but apart from Clinard’s 
(1952) own work, criminologists have not been greatly interested in either black marketeering 
or pandemics, perhaps because, until the COVID-19 one, pandemics have been more salient to 
Asian countries, where white-collar crime research is less developed, but also perhaps because 
white-collar criminologists have been more focused on misconduct by or against big 
corporations by senior insiders. For example, white-collar crime research has tended to focus 
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Economic crime is a mixture of different sorts of high- and low-volume crimes with different 
probabilities of being reported to the authorities and being acted upon. But some insights may 
be gleaned from the framework for the dynamics of crime developed in one study of the 
impact of recessions on illegal drug use (Nagelhout et al. 2017) and another cautionary study 
on the impact of COVID-19 on drug markets (Giommoni 2020). We would anticipate that 
different forms of economic crime might have different rates of change, with or without the 
health and economic crises and the large economic stimulus packages that are far more a 
feature of the COVID-19 crisis than of earlier pandemics. But this is not simply a question of 
financial losses: the emotional and financial impacts of fraud are affected by their affordability 
to those who suffer harms, and they include the impact on trust and confidence in the 
authorities to prevent fraud and to pursue justice. Finally, the report examines whether 
anything has been learned, or reasonably could be learned, from the economic crime and 
crime control responses that followed previous pandemics, economic shocks and crises.
Economic crimes and pandemics
We begin our analysis with pandemics in the modern era: 
• ‘Spanish flu’ 1918–19 (misleadingly named because during the First World War Spain was 
neutral and did not censor its press, leading to an incorrect perception that Spain was the 
origin);
• Asian flu 1957–58;
• Hong Kong flu A (H3N2) 1968;
• swine flu A (H1N1), 2009–10; and
• COVID-19, which was first identified in Wuhan, China.
Resource and time constraints lead us to focus primarily on Australia and the United Kingdom 
as the objects of study: in practice, this means a focus on Spanish flu and COVID-19 because 
the other pandemics hit the above jurisdictions much less hard.
Little attention in the Global North was given to economic crimes during pandemics before 
COVID-19, though there have been efforts during each pandemic to discredit fake cures, which 
appear to have accelerated as social media and anti-government scepticism have generated 
misinformation and commentaries about health risks. For example, genuine Chinese water-
snake oil introduced into the United States by Chinese labourers during the nineteenth century 
contained high levels of omega-3, which can reduce inflammation (Graber 2007). However, 
many products claiming to be snake oil contained none, and this led to occasional prosecutions 
and to the popularity of the phrase ‘snake oil salesman’, meaning someone selling over-hyped 
items (Graber 2007).
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The major books and journal articles on Spanish flu do not mention fraud or corruption (except 
as metaphors), focusing understandably on the dynamics of the pandemic. Among the few 
Spanish flu era media crime stories is that of ‘Slick Julia’ Lyons, who, despite having no real 
medical qualifications, signed on to the home nursing registry in Chicago and fleeced her 
patients, in the end being sentenced to one to 10 years imprisonment (Shafer 2020). Even in 
that case, the fraudulent qualifications were more of a route to theft than ‘real’ fraud as a 
crime technique. Spanish flu fears also generated a rise in seances and spiritualism in the 
United States (Daugherty 2020). In Seattle, one social elite funeral director was acquitted after 
a retrial of defrauding the US government by burying sailors in cheap caskets instead of the 
lined ones stipulated in his contract, and of writing to grieving families asking them to pay for 
coffins the government had already paid for (Berger 2020).
Research into the Spanish flu period shows some commentary on the role of otherwise 
legitimate corporations and shyster firms in making false claims that their products could 
prevent and alleviate Spanish flu. This commentary occurred in the United Kingdom, in what is 
now the Irish Republic, and in the United States, where the public were advised, among other 
things, to ‘eat more onions’ (Arnold 2018). It should be noted that this was a laissez-faire era 
that permitted other deceptive claims, including those promoting the health benefits of 
smoking tobacco (Health Administration Degree programs 2020; Stanford University 2020).
In the United States, numerous advertisements appeared for allegedly health-giving products 
and also for questionable paid learning systems for nurse training, which may or may not have 
been a good investment (see, for example, Wall Street Journal 2020 and Vollet 2020). There is 
no reason to suppose that any of the products advertised were in any way harmful to users. 
They are, however, indicative of the changes that have gone on in the past century in what is 
acceptable and also what is regulated when advertising health benefits. Vick’s VapoRub, for 
example, promoted itself during the Spanish flu era with adverts that vastly boosted its sales. 
One advertisement, for example, states: ‘How to use Vick’s VapoRub in treating Spanish 
Influenza: The influenza germs attack the lining of the air passages. When VapoRub is applied 
over throat and chest the medicated vapors loosen the phlegm, open the air passages and 
stimulate the mucous membrane to throw off the germs’ (UNC Libraries 2020; see also Modern 
Mississauga 2020). Some of the firms included testimonials from soldiers or doctors about the 
efficacy of lotions such as Veno’s in preventing Spanish flu.
In Ireland, Oxo and Bovril advertised their value in fighting off Spanish flu, though they were 
careful not to advertise themselves as a medicine, so this is not fraud. However, if the 
advertising agencies had even suggested it, regulators today would likely require the adverts to 
be taken down (Marsh 2019). Other firms were less careful. An unduly positive sense of 
protection against Spanish flu would have been generated by the cognitive associations in the 
commercials (see Marsh 2019).
Shore (2015) does discuss fraud and organised crime in the United Kingdom up to the end of 
the 1920s, but nothing in her research suggests that Spanish flu or fear of it was used as part of 
these frauds or organised crime activities.
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Pandemics before 2020 did not lead either to ‘moral panics’ about fraud or corruption or to 
noticeably unusual levels of fraud in Australia, the United Kingdom or the United States, 
though they may have done in Asia, where the reporting is harder to access and the crime 
statistics are even less valid or reliable. The New York Times contains no articles on frauds or 
scams connected to 20th- or 21st-century pandemics prior to 2008, and only one in 2009, but 
some local US papers warned of scams and the US Food and Drug Administration and the UK 
government did warn especially about fake cures and counterfeit drugs (FINRA 2020). Then, 
but less visibly or commonly than now, there were claims that the pandemics themselves were 
illusions or what would now be termed ‘fake news’. In 2005 US investors were warned about 
stocks being promoted with false claims that companies were poised to benefit from vaccines 
(FINRA 2020).
Many false claims were made during the swine flu pandemic of 2009–10, leading federal 
officials ‘to send warning letters to promoters of more than 140 swine flu-related products, 
including well-known alternative medicine advocate Dr Andrew Weil for his “Immune Support 
Formula”’ (Marchione 2009). These included outright scams involving fake Tamiflu and health 
products like the ‘Photon Genie’, whose energy waves allegedly eliminated swine flu, and 
otherwise legitimate businesses who sought to boost sales with recklessly optimistic or actively 
deceptive claims. The Food and Drug Administration stated that swine flu scams appeared soon 
after swine flu itself arrived; this later happened with COVID-19 scams, and indeed with other 
events. In Australia, the swine flu pandemic saw a large increase in online scammers seeking to 
profit from the health crisis. Billions of spam emails containing malware were reported, 
including offers of virus information, discount pharmaceuticals and survival kits that were used 
to extract personal identification information and money from Australians (Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2009).
During the swine flu epidemic in China in 2018, some Chinese gangs slaughtered pigs, claiming 
that the pigs had swine flu, and then forced African farmers to sell pork to them at a reduced 
price because of the health scare about pork they themselves had generated by playing upon 
existing scares (Daly 2019). In a very different sort of case, an analyst from the Swiss 
investment bank UBS referred to ‘Chinese pigs’ in a report on pork trends, which led to a 
Chinese backlash against the bank, showing the risks attached to the use of language, 
especially when inflamed by commercial rivals (Weinland, Jenkins & Crow 2019).
This might be described as ‘moral panic for profit’. Although there is little discussion of 
pandemics and fraud, there is a small amount of literature on fraud and corruption following 
(and sometimes causing) disasters. Frailing and Harper (2017) pull together many of these case 
studies and examples in the United States, breaking them up into individual contractor fraud, 
price gouging and profiteering, disaster benefit fraud, and corruption; and corporate disaster 
fraud, including frauds by insurance companies, as liabilities are shifted onto the government 
or corporations. 
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However, the authors note that they focus on the latter phases of disaster, which they assert is 
when crimes of fraud tend to occur. If their work was more international in focus, they might 
have considered European and developing countries, where corruption and fraud in public 
contracting has led to the collapse of bridges, roads et cetera. However, none of this relates 
particularly to pandemics, so we will not discuss this further, except to note that more 
Australian and UK government payouts were made to businesses and individuals during the 
2020 pandemic than in any other historical disaster. These government responses were also 
made at a time when staffing in agencies supplying funds and controlling fraud was particularly 
constrained by the personnel contracting the virus and by having to work from home.
Public warnings about scams have become more proactive in 2020 in Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, though there remain arguments about the effectiveness of 
these warning techniques (Fair 2020; Federal Trade Commission 2020). These arguments are 
out of scope for this study. Indeed, it seems reasonable to suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic 
represents the first time that there has been a systematic approach (at least in the anglophone 
global north) to combating health and financial scams during a pandemic, or even during an 
epidemic, fuelled by more general contemporary concerns about the impact of the internet 
and social media on fraud affecting the general public (and politics). When considering this, it 
may be helpful to think of these educational efforts as demarcated by public warnings about 
consumer and investment scams from the financial sector (eg FINRA 2020), government (eg 
www.scamwatch.gov.au), non-profit bodies, and even some social media companies (eg 
Google’s https://scamspotter.org/). These approaches have also included efforts within the 
public sector to reduce fraud against government expenditure; and advice from financial 
consultancies and government to the business sector aimed at reducing fraud risks from 
changes in the organisation of business in the short and longer term transition to working 
from home.
To date, none of this public advice relates directly to reducing the risk of fraud committed by 
senior executives. It is important to place COVID-19 scams in perspective. A huge number of 
elite, blue collar and ‘organised crime’ frauds go on independently, generated by a wide range 
of opportunities and motivations. Pandemics alter the shape of some of these opportunities 
and pressures on individuals, but they do not dominate fraud or other economic crimes.
Crime and economic crises
The literature on fraud and economic crises is more substantial than that on pandemics, but is 
still modest and patchy. The International Monetary Fund defines a global economic crisis as a 
decline in real per-capita world gross domestic product, in the context of changes in other 
global macro-economic indicators. Those indicators include industrial production, trade, capital 
flows, oil consumption and unemployment. By that definition, prior to 2019, there have been 
four global recessions since World War II: in 1975, 1982, 1991 and 2009, of which 2009 was by 
far the greatest and most widespread (Davis 2009). National recessions are more common (for 
the wealthier OECD countries, see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Technical recessions, 1960–2019
In technical recession        Not in technical recession        No data














































Source: Kiersz 2019 and OECD 2020
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The magisterial account of 800 years of financial follies by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) contains 
no references at all to fraud, scams, misconduct or crime in its entire 512 pages, though a 
4th-century swindle is mentioned briefly. Aliber and Kindleberger (2015) frequently mention 
them in the seventh edition of their book Manias, panics, and crashes, which has a whole 
chapter on frauds (ch 7) and deals with 10 financial bubbles (2015: 18), seven of which fall 
within the period of study (see Box 1).
Box 1: Financial bubbles throughout history
1 The Dutch tulip bubble 1636
2 The South Sea bubble 1720
3 The Mississippi bubble 1720
4 The stock price bubble 1927–29
5 The surge in bank loans to Mexico and other developing countries in the 1970s
6 The bubble in real estate and stocks in Japan 1985–89
7 The 1985–89 bubble in real estate and stocks in Finland, Norway and Sweden
8 The bubble in real estate and stocks in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and several other 
Asian countries 1992–97 and the surge in foreign investment in Mexico 1990–94
9 The bubble in over-the-counter stocks in the United States 1995–2000
10 The real estate bubble in the United States, Britain, Spain, Ireland and Iceland between 
2002 and 2007
Source: Aliber & Kindleberger (2015)
The manias and banking crises in the nineteenth century often occurred after a period of 
extended investment in infrastructure such as canals and railroads. Banking crises were 
frequent between 1920 and 1940. The percentage increases in stock prices between 1980 and 
2020 were larger than in earlier times, and five of the 10 manias in Box 1 occurred in this 
period. Sharp increases in prices of real estate and of stocks have often occurred together, 
perhaps because many listed companies own large amounts of real estate. But Ponzi schemes 
and other ‘bubble’ business promoters appear to use as a rationale for their promotions both 
the prospect of being in on the ground floor of booming economic activity and (as in the most 
recent years, even preceding the COVID period) the need to beat low interest rates. Aliber and 
Kindleberger (2015: 29–30) state:
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Crashes and panics are often precipitated by the revelation of some 
misfeasance, malfeasance or malversation (the corruption of officials) that 
occurred during the mania. One inference is that the swindles are a 
response to the appetite for wealth (or plain greed) stimulated by the 
boom; the Smiths want to keep up with the Joneses and some Smiths 
engage in fraudulent behavior to do so. As the monetary system gets 
stretched, institutions lose liquidity and as unsuccessful swindles seem 
about to be revealed, the temptation to take the money and run 
becomes irresistible.
However, as we shall see, this tells only part of the story, reflecting their focus on macro-
economic factors in crises and a limited range of frauds that they consider relevant to that 
narrative, which largely excludes outright planned scams and volume frauds. Chapter 7 of their 
book is a history of financial scandals at various periods, but none of the examples cited 
mention pandemics, and the main theme is that fraud goes up during boom times, when 
people want to share in the benefits of growing profits. Some of the most damaging corporate 
frauds get shaken out in recessions. More often, however, those corporate deceptions that fall 
short of outright Ponzi schemes happen because corporate acquisitions have to rise faster than 
market expectations to sustain stock prices, and the schemers run out of time since under-
priced businesses are no longer available to buy to boost share prices. This is what occurred in 
the case of Enron (Fox 2003). Ponzi schemes are inevitably self-liquidating, though some like 
Bernie Madoff’s may last for years (see Balleisen 2017).
Van Driel (2019) gives a good conceptual overview of anglophone historians’ work on fraud. 
There has been far more work on fraud in Victorian Britain than on any other time, and 
although histories of the United States often contain colourful accounts of the depredations of 
the ‘Robber Barons’ during the nineteenth century, this is not linked in the literature to any 
pandemic (other than greed!) nor to any macro-economic crises. Shore (2015) does discuss 
fraud and organised crime in the United Kingdom up to the end of the 1920s, but economic 
crises make an appearance only in influencing the media and social construction of the 
problem as threatening ‘Englishness’ in the post-World War I period. In his extensive classic 
Social aspects of crime between the wars, Mannheim (1940) discusses only five instances of 
fraud, which, he states, more closely than other crime ‘follows the zigzag course of the 
economy, political and social life of the country, although its relation to the business cycle may 
differ from that of larceny’ (1940: 118). He mentions charity frauds, and also that whereas 
most frauds and corruption in Germany require the connivance of public officials, British frauds 
do not. He draws attention to share-pushing frauds, to drawing unemployment benefits while 
working, to railway fare evasion frauds, and to bankruptcy frauds as rare examples of recidivist 
swindlers. However, no particular link is made to the Great Depression or to other economic 
booms or busts, which does not mean that there is no link: the absence of evidence is not 
evidence of absence.
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Maurer’s (2000) classic ethnographic text The big con (originally published in 1940) discusses 
extensively frauds in the early part of the twenty-first century, though not with any focus on 
the Great Depression or its effects on these cons. A short introduction by Sante (2000) to the 
republished edition of The big con notes that the ‘golden age of the big con’ was from the turn 
of the century to the Great Depression, with its peak occurring roughly 1914–1923, being a 
period of rising affluence and socio-economic mobility in the American middle class. Sante 
(2000) plausibly asserts that this led people to have confidence in their own perspicacity and 
enhanced their vulnerability to fraud, a view consistent with more recent work on the social 
psychology of deception (eg Cialdini 2009). Houlbrook’s (2016) absorbing study of post-World 
War I ‘gentleman crook’ Netley Lucas shows how he simulated the dress style and provenance 
of a gentleman and former naval officer to leave a trail of debts, and even his imprisonment 
and criminal autobiography appeared not to dent his credibility; indeed, it added to his 
apparent authenticity. However, this might be interpreted better as a way of imitating credit-
worthiness in the (later) manner of ‘Catch me if you can’ Frank Abagnale, and there is nothing 
to connect his conduct to either Spanish flu or the recession that started in the late 1920s.
More serious is the argument over the role of fraud in stimulating or causing the Great 
Depression. Blinder (2014) defensibly prefers to call ‘near-fraud’ the conflicts of interest and 
the manipulations of profitability and securities that precipitated the Wall Street crash of 1929 
and which, via national protectionist policies, generated economic crises in Europe and 
elsewhere. Other commentators (and the Pecora Commission established in the 1930s to 
investigate the causes) are less hesitant in labelling the conduct as fraud (Balleisen 2017). Given 
that no-one was jailed for the malefactions (though some were jailed for other fraudulent 
conduct), it might be more accurate to state that the (mis)conduct was regulated or 
criminalised as part of the New Deal reforms in the mid-1930s. So it might well have been 
fraud had it occurred later but was not (criminal) fraud at the time. 
A hypothesis that the Great Depression caused fraud would need to examine when the 
misconduct began, to test the proposition that it was caused by the Depression rather than 
that the Depression revealed what had been going on before. As at present, many ‘short cons’ 
may not lead to prosecution but they appear rapidly after commission, whereas other frauds 
take years to be completed and dealt with. Credit for individuals for consumer purchases or 
even for mortgages barely existed for the masses in the 1920s and 1930s, but the normal effect 
of recessions is to make credit harder to obtain. This means that many people must deceive to 
get credit, making them technically fraudsters even if they were not what Levi (2008) terms 
‘pre-planned’ fraudsters. Telling lies to get fresh credit or to delay repayment would be 
‘slippery slope fraud’, and that may have been the characteristic feature of most business and 
individual fraud in the 1930s. Other economic crises prior to 2008 were less global. Some 
authors include the fraud-rich ‘dotcom’ bubble, which mainly affected the United States and 
Europe, though it affected some international investors: too complex and large a topic for this 
account. This bubble certainly led to an accentuation of frauds, as businesses piled on 
deceptions in order to keep in business.
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Economic crimes and the ‘black market’
There is limited literature on the black market economy in the United Kingdom (Ellis 2018; 
Roodhouse 2013; Smithies 1982) and even less on that of Australia (Grabosky 1977; Treasury 
2017). Smithies does mention the theft of gas masks, but not in the context of our 
contemporary concern with personal protective equipment (PPE) but for tax reasons: pouring 
petrol, stolen from military storage dumps, through a gas mask to filter out the distinctive 
coloured dye put in to deter tax-evaded resale. One notes the marginal, vicarious involvement 
of thousands of otherwise law-abiding citizens who in a time of acute scarcity were reluctant to 
identify criminal suppliers if this meant the supply drying up. 
Roodhouse’s (2013) analysis examines, among other things, the way in which officials 
calculated a fair share, a fair price, and a fair profit, and—relevant to contemporary perceptions 
of price ‘gouging’—how official understanding of fair shares clashed with popular notions of 
distributive justice. Discussing the four-week imprisonment of composer and actor Ivor Novello 
for cheating war rationing of petrol with the assistance of a member of his fan club, and the 
economic analysis of black marketeering, Roodhouse (2013: 6) critiques economists’ approach, 
noting that ‘neither Boulding nor Becker acknowledged that the emotional content of social 
norms governing the exchange, distribution, and use of resources makes cold calculation 
difficult if not impossible’. 
It should, however, be noted that cold calculation is precisely what is normally applied to 
medical interventions to judge cost-effectiveness. The COVID-19 pandemic has shown how, at 
times, this model is overridden by the politics of health care: COVID-19 deaths appear to be 
weighted far more heavily than other deaths (and medical help foregone) in the political 
cost–benefit analysis. Roodhouse (2013) goes on to stress the high tolerance of black 
marketeering for both barter and low-profit money among the middle as well as working 
classes, but the intolerance of professional criminal price gouging of gangsters. This theme is 
taken up by Farrall and Karstedt (2020) in their analysis of middle-class offending and attitudes 
to offending, mostly in Europe, in the twenty-first century.
In addition to the black market, many other wartime activities offered scope for the 
unscrupulous (Ellis 2018). For example, the massive amount of civil defence work 
commissioned was ripe for corruption and fraud: in West London, a contractor conspired with 
the London Hammersmith clerk of works to falsely certify air-raid shelters as sound when they 
had been shoddily built and fraudulently expensed and were unfit for purpose. People died 
who should have been safe from the bombs, and manslaughter prosecutions followed. Some 
doctors profited from a popular scam of providing false military exemption certificates to those 
who did not wish to fight: a broader theme of relevance to some contemporary politicians. Dr 
William Sutton of Stepney (East London) would freely issue such exemptions for half a crown 
without even bothering to see the ‘patients’. He went to jail and his name was removed from 
the Register of Medical Practitioners in May 1943, although it was restored after 54 months. 
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Smith (1994) recorded the large increase in disciplinary cases coming before the General 
Medical Council in which medical practitioners gave false certificates allowing their ‘patients’ to 
avoid military service during the Second World War. Cases of fraud involving doctors also 
increased during and following the wars. This is the kind of fraud that might be picked up with 
modern data analysis, if issuers of exemptions or other ‘enablers’ were included in 
the datasets.
Fraud reported in the media
Toms (2019) provides evidence on the patterns of fraudulent behaviour over extended periods 
of time, based on content analysis of contemporary news sources in the United Kingdom 
(1715–2009) and the United States (1850–2009) and a database of 221 British corporate 
scandals (1800–2009). This analysis is very useful and competent, but his chosen focus is on 
the implications for auditing, and most ‘garden variety’ frauds are of little interest to auditors 
or to political economists, and therefore fall beyond Toms’ purview. Furthermore, the analysis 
of financial scandals understandably shows little interest in the selective nature of media 
publicity, which focuses on ‘newsworthy’ material which touches either business or populist 
local and national concerns (Levi 2006, 2008), omitting duller cases which do not stimulate the 
interest of the public to read or view, or (important to contemporary media) generate online 
advertising revenue (Figure 2). 





































































































Note: Popularity % is the number of documents featuring ‘fraud’ divided by all relevant documents, where a relevant 
document is a news story published in the ‘News’, ‘Business News’ or ‘Opinion and Editorial’ section of a newspaper/
periodical as defined by the Cengage database
Source: Calculated by Toms (2019) from Gale Cengage online database of British newspapers
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Figure 3 presents data on generic financial crime for 1715–2009 calculated from the Gale 
Cengage online database of British newspapers.
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Note: Popularity % for each term is number of documents featuring ‘forgery’, ‘corruption’ or ‘counterfeit’ divided by 
all relevant documents, where a relevant document is a news story published in the ‘News’, ‘Business News’ or 
‘Opinion and Editorial’ section of a newspaper/periodical as defined by the Cengage database
Source: Calculated by Toms (2019) from the Gale Cengage online database of British newspapers
Tooze (2019) gives a much broader and deeper account of economic crises than authors 
discussed hitherto, though fraud does not appear in it. Overall it is clear from the broader 
historical literature that fraud is very seldom if ever macro-economically significant (in the 
International Monetary Fund’s sense of that term). Widespread mortgage fraud in the United 
States came closest, with financial instruments precipitating the 2008 financial crisis, even if 
almost no-one in elite financial circles in any country was ever prosecuted for it. The label of 
‘fraud’ was firmly resisted by politicians as well as by businesspeople, who preferred to deal 
pragmatically with the economic problems without the inconvenient obstacle of moral hazard 
or crime getting in the way (Levi 2009). However, though the scale of the mortgage fraud and 
the sheer volume of over-valued synthetic finance on the back of it had an impact on the crash, 
the sudden loss of credit shook out the mortgage frauds involving the ‘self-declared income’ of 
those who were not legally eligible for the large loans they received. They had been 
encouraged to falsify their incomes by brokers (who often completed the application forms for 
them, sometimes without their detailed knowledge), and the securitisation process through 
law firms and investment banks systematically over-graded the value of the loan books thus 
falsified, with disastrous consequences once the Lehman Brothers collapse pricked the bubble 
(Balleisen 2017; Fligstein & Roehrkasse 2016; Tett 2009; Tooze 2019). So as with the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, although the serious financial misconduct of major market actors led 
to great socio-economic harm, the crime and criminal justice statistics show that identified 
fraud rates were low and that the frauds were mostly committed by social outsiders.
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Some frauds whose commission long preceded economic crises are brought into victim and/or 
public consciousness as a result of the credit squeeze. Some ‘organised criminals’ (an 
ambiguous term of art) may be drawn into greater confidence in making fraud participation 
offers to insiders or blackmailing them because of the insider’s inability to repay debts and 
because they believe that people are more corruptible at times of economic stress. Some fraud 
opportunities linked to workplaces will be reduced because if people motivated to defraud 
have lost their jobs, they can no longer commit internal frauds. But in other cases where 
opportunities remain, temptations are greater because of the desire not to lose lifestyle and 
social status. 
Levi (2008) categorises fraud as pre-planned fraud, intermediate fraud (starts off honest and 
consciously turns to fraud), and slippery-slope fraud (tells lies to continue trading, in the 
unrealistic hope that things will turn around). Using this typology, there have been both extra 
and reduced risks of motivation, opportunity, and capable guardianship. The net effect of these 
changes is difficult to determine, and most fraud data—other than plastic card fraud—are too 
dependent on changing probabilities of recognition, reporting and recording to enable 
confident inferences about trends to be drawn. It seems plausible that more slippery-slope 
insolvency frauds occur in times of recession, as some company directors and professionals 
seek to protect income and wealth from the economic consequences of the downturn. There is 
no evidence that the global financial crisis of 2008–09 had a major impact on increasing the 
cost or levels of fraud overall in the areas about which we have the best knowledge: Australia, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. However, the scale of the public expenditure 
stimulus schemes of 2020 present particular risks of fraud that, as far as is known, have not 
been present to the same extent in earlier pandemics and economic crises. The 2020 pandemic 
also created opportunities for other types of financial misconduct and suspicions thereof—for 
example, where contracts were entered into for the supply of PPE with companies without a 
demonstrated track record in fulfilling such obligations, leading sometimes to poor quality 
products, default and very high profits for intermediaries, as well as side-stepping genuine and 
competent firms. It also provoked concerns in the wider community about the ability of 
governments to minimise risks of procurement fraud and corruption in times of 
national emergencies.
Some arguably trivial points are worth stressing. To the extent that crimes are occupational, 
one must have an occupation in order to commit them: thus, though motivation to offend may 
rise during economic crises, opportunities to defraud may fall. To illustrate this, before their 
corporate collapses, fraudulent chief executives and dotcom bubble chiefs were able to allocate 
to the company expenditures that were in fact largely or wholly personal. Some of them went 
to jail for this, but not many. Economic pressures increase at times of crisis, but accountants, 
bankers and lawyers cannot readily manipulate clients’ accounts or set up trust and other 
corporate secrecy vehicles if they no longer have jobs, though they (and anyone else) can make 
up imaginary firms and may have a pretext for fake corporate instructions to firms. 
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Unless constrained by culture, surveillance or anti-money laundering regulations, professionals 
in the same or another jurisdiction may be willing to take on the business. If others have 
confidence in them, entrepreneurs can develop new businesses that may generate new 
manipulative possibilities, but this would usually take longer at times of recession unless they 
tap into special government schemes.
At a lower status level of white-collar crimes, staff in call centres (whether physically located in 
the Global North or in anglophone India or Bangladesh) cannot so easily copy and extract 
personal data of account-holders if they are no longer employed in the call centres. If still 
employed, they may be more tempted to defraud if they consider that they may shortly 
become unemployed or that the company will show no loyalty towards them. The sudden 
furloughing of staff in call centres during the COVID-19 pandemic gave them little warning of 
their changed employment position, and UK police noted the decline in fake ‘Microsoft 
engineer’ calls attributed to ‘rogue individuals or teams’ in those call centres. This ‘situational 
opportunity’ model seems valid given that more people have been at home in the daytime to 
answer calls during the pandemic, so the available victim population is larger than normal. 
Financial and social pressures to offend may also be affected by fear of redundancy and peer 
group pressures, though threats from organised crime groups and ethnic/family loyalties may 
not be related to economic crises.
The ability of ‘insiders’ to offend may, however, be reduced by physical opportunity controls 
such as the absence of USB and CD drives on computers and rapid integrity checks. In addition, 
the miniaturisation of cameras and voice recorders on phones can assist data exfiltration for 
intellectual property crimes and the creation of scam ‘sucker lists’. Under such circumstances, 
voluntary compliance via procedural legitimacy becomes much harder to achieve. 
Rises in card-not-present payment card frauds are partly the product of increased 
opportunities and control weaknesses: they have little relationship to economic crises, though 
financial pressures may increase first-party frauds (by otherwise legitimate cardholders) or 
frauds by or in collaboration with merchants. The rise in mortgage frauds (Carswell & Bachtel 
2009) and consumer/investment scams energised the regulatory process during the past 
decade, assisted by forensic linking software developments which make it easier proactively to 
search out connections between banking and insurance fraud networks. Since Ponzi 
investment pyramids rely on a high rate of incoming investments to sustain payouts, a fall in 
the rate of increase of investments or a reduction in the rate of reinvestment of imaginary 
profits causes them to collapse earlier. We should note also that, although there have already 
been some major corporate scandals during the present recession, the loss of confidence in 
growth and the rise in corporate short-sellers publicising their intensively researched (if often 
disputed) critiques of their target companies can serve to deflate the share prices and lead to 
(or sometimes follow) newspaper investigations that expose high level and serious corporate 
misconduct, including fraud and thefts of cryptocurrencies (see Poltz 2020 regarding the 
Wirecard prosecutions in Germany, which might not have happened without extensive 
Financial Times coverage despite attempted muzzling).
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Australian perspectives on economic crises
Such historical accounts have focused on anglophone literature on the United Kingdom, United 
States and to a lesser extent Asia. Australia has not much interested them, being relatively 
unimportant to the world financial system (though important to this review and to people 
living there). However, financial journalist Trevor Sykes (1988, 1994, 2010) has written three 
lengthy books on the history of Australian corporate scandals, each showing how little 
businesspeople, politicians and regulators have learned from the previous crises, while 
academics such as Jones (2010) and Carnegie and O’Connell (2014) have dissected the issues. 
Levi and Smith (2011) examined the role that fraud played during and following the global 
financial crisis of 2008–09, and cited data on fraud offences recorded by police in Australia. 
Updated to 2019, Figure 4 shows that the rate of recorded fraud was declining prior to and 
during the global financial crisis but increased approximately two years later and continued to 
grow for a further five years. This reflects the time taken for cases to proceed through the 
courts, as well as the effects of the economic downturn on increasing the motivations for fraud 
offending. This has generated considerable concern in 2020, as the problems of adapting 
criminal courts to COVID-19 have led to massive delays in criminal justice (Transform 
Justice 2020).










































































Source: AIC statistical collection: recorded fraud data from police jurisdictions
Earlier Australian data on the rate of fraud, forgery and false pretences convictions in 
magistrates courts in New South Wales between 1880 and 1970 show troughs in convictions 
during war time, followed by increases shortly thereafter, as well as a marked increase during 
the Great Depression and following the Second World War (Figure 5). It should be noted that 
these data relate to lower court convictions in New South Wales only and would exclude major, 
serious and high-value matters. New South Wales was the only jurisdiction that had consistent 
fraud data during the years in question (see Mukherjee et al. 1988).
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Figure 5: Fraud, forgery and false pretences convictions in New South Wales magistrates 




























































Note: Rates have been calculated on the basis of Australian historical population statistics (ABS 2008)
Source: Data are derived from Mukherjee et al. 1988: 278–80
For the purposes of this report, it is worth considering what the connection may be between 
these ‘big economic crimes’ and the smaller, blue-collar and white-collar ones and those 
committed by ‘organised criminals’ in the conventional sense of the term (see Levi & Soudijn 
2020 for further discussion of the relationship between fraud and organised money laundering, 
and May & Bhardwa 2018 on fraud and organised crime groups in the UK). Cooper, Dacin and 
Palmer (2013) describe four domains of fraudulent behaviour: individual, firm, organisational 
field, and society at large. Gray, Frieder and Clark (2005: 41) argue that factors shown to be 
significant to financial bubbles include rapid economic and monetary expansion, the presence 
of ‘first-time and/or unsophisticated investors’, and economic slowdown revealing and 
aggravating the problems of the companies involved. Toms (2019) shows how clusters of 
technological changes enlarge the opportunities for fraud by increasing uncertainty and 
information asymmetry, with the asymmetry making it harder both for investors and regulators 
to monitor fraud (see also Hollow 2015), but whether this applies to all forms of fraud is open 
to question.
Disaster-related fraud
Fraud has also been found during and following natural disasters, such as floods, cyclones and 
bushfires, as well as industrial accidents (see Frailing & Harper 2017; Jackman 2017; Kerstein 
2006), such as the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, following which 311 people had been 
convicted by September 2016, with 102 sent to prison, seven for five years or more (Crooks 
2017). Following the Hurricane Katrina disaster in the United States in 2005, large numbers of 
false claims were made and over 1,300 prosecuted (Economist 2017). 
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Such was the level of fraud following Katrina that the US Department of Justice established the 
National Center for Disaster Fraud in the same year, and since then it has received over 
100,000 complaints (US Department of Justice 2020). There have subsequently been large civil 
recoveries from contractors and public institutions making false claims. Risks generally relate to 
fraudulent charitable solicitations to support victims and their families, false insurance claims, 
consumer frauds involving repairs and recovery operations, and fraudulent applications for 
government relief and support payments (see Box 2). Historical examples have close parallels 
with the dishonest practices currently emerging during the coronavirus pandemic, although 
differing somewhat owing to the current reliance on digital technologies to commit fraud 
(see below).
Box 2: Fraud following the Grenfell Tower fire in London
In the early hours of Wednesday 14 June 2017 a fire broke out in the kitchen of Flat 16 
Grenfell Tower, a high-rise residential building in North Kensington, West London. The fire 
claimed the lives of 71 people who were in the tower that night. An inquiry into the fire 
found that it was started by an electrical fault in a large fridge-freezer in the kitchen of Flat 
16 but escaped into the cladding. Once established within the cladding, the fire spread 
rapidly up the outside of the building and firefighters were unable to fight it successfully. 
Within 20 minutes a vertical column of flame had reached the top of the building on the east 
side, from where it progressed around the rest of the structure, so that within a few hours it 
had engulfed almost the whole of the building (Grenfell Tower Inquiry 2019: 3).
Following the fire, the government offered residents emergency accommodation, a 
minimum £5,500 payment from the Grenfell Tower Residents’ Discretionary Fund and new 
housing. In the months that followed, a number of individuals who claimed to have been 
sharing flats with residents who did not survive, fraudulently claimed emergency 
accommodation and other payments amounting to many hundreds of thousands of pounds.
By November 2019, Kensington and Chelsea council had paid out £775,000 to 16 fraudsters 
who have since been sentenced by the courts for claiming payments dishonestly. An 
additional eight cases are still being investigated or proceeding through the courts. As at 
November 2019, police had only recovered £24,000.
One of the most serious cases involved a 26-year-old man who claimed £81,000 in cash and 
free hotel stays as well as £11,000 towards a new permanent home, saying that he had lived 
in a Grenfell flat that actually had been occupied by a family of five who all died in the fire. 
He was charged with dishonestly making a false representation for accommodation and 
subsistence between June 2017 and June 2018 and sentenced to six years imprisonment 
(Daily Mail 2018).
Source: Daily Mail 2018; Gregory 2019; Grenfell Tower Inquiry 2019
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Such disaster-driven frauds have also occurred in Australia. For example, on 31 July 1902, a 
serious mining disaster occurred at Mount Kembla in New South Wales. After a fortnight, on 16 
August 1902, the Sydney Mail and New South Wales Advertiser (1902) reported that ‘bogus 
collection frauds’ were already circulating. The YMCA Sydney was falsely represented in an 
attempt to scam generous members of the public for donations ‘to relieve the widows and 
orphans of the unfortunate men who lost their lives in so sudden and awful a manner’ (Sydney 
Mail and New South Wales Advertiser 1902). Similar scams continued for over a year and 
spread across the country. On 11 December 1903, the Geraldton Advertiser (1903) in Western 
Australia published an article detailing a fake Art Union auto raffle whose proceeds were 
supposedly going to the widows and orphans of the deceased Mount Kembla miners but were 
never received. Similarly, during the Great Depression in the 1930s many street frauds occurred 
in Australian cities in which children were used to target the wealthy for donations (Morton & 
Lobez 2011).
Natural disasters in Australia, particularly bushfires and floods, also created opportunities for 
various types of fraud (see, for example, Canberra Times 1974). In 1939, private donors were 
targeted by individuals claiming to be from the Warrandyte Bushfire Relief Committee (Weekly 
Times 1939). One of the most extensive bushfire-related frauds followed the 16 February 1983 
Ash Wednesday bushfires in South Australia. The then head of the Victorian-based National 
Safety Council of Australia used the aftermath of the bushfires to secure hundreds of millions 
of dollars in loans guaranteed with non-existent collateral. The funding was used for the safety 
council’s expansion until the fraud was uncovered five years later (Morton & Lobez 2011). The 
Australian bushfires of 2019–20, which, in eastern Victoria alone, burnt 1.5m hectares of 
bushland, destroyed over 450 homes and forced 60,000 people to evacuate the area, also 
created many opportunities for dishonesty. The Victorian government response and recovery 
costs totalled $450m (Fowler 2020), a proportion of which was lost to fraud targeting both 
victims of the bushfires and those willing to donate funds, with over $400,000 recorded in 
losses to charity scams in 2019 alone (Cross 2020).
Flood relief fraud also used this approach, with one man jailed for falsely claiming funds on 
behalf of the Kempsey Flood Relief Committee (Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners’ 
Advocate 1949). Another flood relief fraud occurred in Queensland, where a Brisbane woman 
falsely pretended to a Queensland Government flood relief official that her home had been 
damaged by floodwaters and received a relief payment.
Other disaster-related frauds have also occurred, including one in which insurers lost $50m in 
fabricated claims for repairs to homes damaged in the December 1989 Newcastle earthquake 
(Canberra Times 1991). Similar scams also quickly followed Cyclone Pam, which devastated the 
island nation of Vanuatu in March 2015, involving requests for donations from false Australian 
charities, the use of two fraudulent Instagram accounts, as well as people pretending to be 
from known Australian charities soliciting donations door-to-door and at shopping centres 
(Thomas 2015).
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Fraud has also occurred following industrial and aviation accidents. On 10 February 1964, for 
example, the HMAS Voyager collided with the HMAS Melbourne off the coast of New South 
Wales and sunk, killing 82 military personnel. A fortnight later, a woman was arrested for 
pretending to be a relative of one of the deceased sailors in an attempt to gain financial 
benefits (Canberra Times 1964). The loss of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over Ukraine on 17 
July 2014, in which all onboard died, was quickly followed by the creation of a number of 
Facebook pages in the names of the 27 Australian victims seeking donations dishonestly (IFW 
Global 2014). Fraudulent spam emails using the names of confirmed victims were also sent out 
worldwide, promising large inheritances to beneficiaries willing to pay a settlement fee in 
advance (We Live Security 2014).
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Technology as an enabler of 
fraud during pandemics
As the coronavirus pandemic developed in 2020, social distancing measures required people to 
remain in their homes, leading to intense reliance on digital technologies. This created 
substantial opportunities for individuals to commit online fraud and to be victimised on a 
widespread scale (Europol 2020; Walker 2020). Cybersecurity problems have also arisen due to 
home-based workers not adhering adequately to business cybersecurity policies, such as user 
authentication protocols, as well as improper sharing of sensitive corporate data with 
unauthorised family members. In one survey of 848 adults in the United States working from 
home due to COVID-19, 23 percent used personal devices for work, 37 percent re-used 
passwords for business purposes, and 53 percent indicated that their employer had no new 
security policies to manage personally identifiable information (Stupp & Rundle 2020). Two 
principal vectors have involved dissemination of consumer scams and the commission of 
payment system fraud.
Consumer scams during the COVID-19 pandemic
‘As early as January 2020, cybersecurity companies like Kaspersky and Mimecast…reported 
several specific email phishing scams related to coronavirus’ (Zirkle 2020: np). Phishing emails 
purporting to come from the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the World 
Health Organization contained information about the coronavirus, but also links to malicious 
websites, or malware that permitted access to personal information. In addition to phishing, 
criminals quickly adapted conventional online scams to the coronavirus pandemic using various 
advance fee frauds, investment scams, charity and fundraising frauds, sale of non-existent or 
defective products and services, and illegal price gouging associated with PPE, safety and 
treatment products to deal with the virus (Zirkle 2020). The UK National Cyber Security Centre 
(NCSC) has noted phishing and malware related to health advice, contact tracing, funds and 
rebates, and fake goods and services—from PPE to disinfecting driveways (NCSC 2020). In 
2020, the NCSC (2020) scanned more than 1.4m National Health Service IP endpoint addresses 
for vulnerabilities, leading to the detection of 51,000 indicators of compromise. The centre also 
worked with international allies to raise awareness of the threat to vaccine research. In July 
2020, for example:
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…the NCSC revealed Russian cyber actors, known as APT29, had been 
targeting organisations involved in coronavirus vaccine development. The 
NCSC assessed that APT29, also named “The Dukes” or “Cozy Bear”, almost 
certainly operated as part of Russian intelligence services. (NCSC 2020: 20)
Bereavement scammers have targeted families organising funerals by purporting to be from 
their local authority’s bereavement services team and asking for credit card details to pay the 
funeral director. Families are told that the funeral will be cancelled if they do not pay 
immediately. Some e-commerce sites that arose in 2020 offered a range of extraordinary 
products for sale:
One of the new sites marketed an “oxygen concentration” machine for 
$3,080. Another had the “Corona Necklace Air Purifier”, which for $59 
claimed to provide “All Day Protection”. A third offered a $299 pill that 
promised “Anti-Viral Protection” for 30 days. And sites such as 
CoronavirusGetHelp.com and test-for-covid19.com marketed home test kits 
for $29.99 to $79, none of which have been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (Keller & Lorenz 2020)
Consumer protection organisations across the globe began receiving complaints and 
notifications from victims of these scams, with substantial losses being suffered. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, as early as 6 March, the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau reported at 
least 21 confirmed cases of coronavirus-related fraud, with victims losing more than £800,000. 
Half of these reports were made by victims who tried to purchase large orders of surgical 
masks from fraudulent merchants who took their money but did not deliver product of the 
right quality. The others included victims of various fake website phishing attacks. On 9 March 
2020, the US Food and Drug Administration and Federal Trade Commission issued joint warning 
letters to seven companies for selling fraudulent products claimed to prevent, treat, mitigate, 
diagnose or cure coronavirus disease (Zirkle 2020).
In March 2020, Operation Pangea XIII was conducted by police, customs and health regulators 
from 90 countries, all aiming to prevent illicit online sales of medicines and medical products. 
Counterfeit face masks and unauthorised antiviral medications were all seized under the 
operation. On 19 March, the UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (2020) 
reported finding 2,000 online advertisements related to coronavirus and seizing over 34,000 
fraudulent products, such as ‘corona spray’, ‘coronavirus medicines’ or ‘coronaviruses 
packages’.
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Since it was established in April 2020, the phishing reporting mechanism at the UK National 
Cyber Security Centre has helped them to take down over 300,000 malicious URLs linking to 
fake celebrity-endorsed investment schemes featuring famous faces such as Sir Richard 
Branson and Martin Lewis. Reports from the public to the NCSC’s Suspicious Email Reporting 
Service, a pioneering system which received over 2.3m reports from the public between April 
and August 2020, resulted in more than 22,237 malicious URLs being blocked or taken down 
and 9,315 scams being taken down or removed, many relating to coronavirus scams. More 
than half of these URLs related to cryptocurrency investment scams (NCSC 2020). Whenever a 
change is announced, such as the requirement for over-75s to pay for BBC television licences, 
this leads to scam emails requesting personal financial information for harvesting. Between 
1 September 2019 and 31 August 2020, the NCSC responded to more than 200 incidents 
relating to the United Kingdom’s coronavirus response (28% of all incidents handled by the 
NCSC), with more than 15,000 coronavirus-related malicious campaigns taken down (NCSC 
2020). In the previous three years since launching, the NCSC supported an average of 602 
incidents annually—590 in 2017, 557 in 2018 and 658 in 2019 (NCSC 2020).
The range of adaptations of conventional scams to the pandemic environment has been 
extensive, with criminals developing scams involving PPE and fake cures, domestic pet scams, 
employment scams, investment frauds, travel refund and insurance scams, and a variety of 
phishing attacks, identity crimes and ransomware threats involving COVID-19 scenarios, 
sometimes impersonating contact tracing officials to obtain personal and banking information. 
There have also been reports of false charity scams and phishing emails claiming to provide 
important information regarding the latest coronavirus updates, local testing stations, potential 
cures, cheap medical products or working from home (IDCARE 2020). Financial losses in the 
United Kingdom have predominantly come from online shopping in which victims have ordered 
face masks, hand sanitiser and other PPE that fails to be delivered (Action Fraud 2020). There 
have also been reports of ticket refund fraud due to travel restrictions, romance fraud, charity 
fraud and financial loan fraud. Online loan sharking now has a higher success rate as 
unemployment and the global economic downturn caused by the pandemic has left many 
indebted and impoverished (Felbab-Brown 2020).
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Some COVID-19-related frauds have involved pure cyber-dependent activities. Examples 
include the fabrication of a false version of Johns Hopkins University’s COVID-19 interactive 
map using a domain created by cybercriminals (Cuthbertson 2020). In another case, a 
user-initiated thread on Russian-language cybercriminal forum XSS advertised a method of 
delivering malware via an email attachment disguised as a distribution map of the coronavirus 
outbreak containing real-time data from the World Health Organization. The offer was priced at 
US$200 for a ‘private build’, and if buyers also required a Java CodeSign certificate the price 
would be US$700 (Guirakhoo 2020). Many coronavirus-related domains have also been 
registered by cybercriminals, leading officials to warn users to not open attachments or click on 
links in emails coming from so-called informational websites. For example, Malwarebytes Labs 
reported that a Twitter user, @dustyfresh, published a web tracker that found 3,600 
coronavirus and COVID-19-related hostnames created in the preceding 24 hours (Ruiz 2020). 
RiskIQ (2020), a US-based cybersecurity company, tracked more than 13,000 suspicious 
coronavirus-related domains over a weekend, with more than 35,000 new domains discovered 
the following day.
Working from home due to social distancing requirements has created many opportunities for 
cyber-related fraud. Cybercriminals have exploited a legitimate US-based Microsoft support 
number for Australian customers. When Australians call the US 1800 support number, it 
redirects them to one registered by the scammers. Victims are asked to provide their name and 
date of birth for a call-back service. When the call is returned, the victim is instructed to 
download a remote access program giving the criminals direct access to their computer. The 
cybercriminal then convinces the user that their computer is compromised and due to 
COVID-19 measures they must pay a fee in untraceable cryptocurrency to correct the problem. 
The scammers have also attempted to gain access to bank account information and online 
banking apps during the remote access session (Australian Cyber Security Centre 2020).
The extent to which these are ‘excess scams’ (by analogy with ‘excess deaths’) is hard to 
identify, especially at this early stage. However, whether or not these scams would have 
happened anyway in a different format, these examples demonstrate the rapidity with which at 
least some criminals are able to adapt the narratives on which to hang their deceptions. They 
also show the imperfect (and largely unresearched) impact that regular warnings in the media 
and policing interventions have had in stopping victims from falling for them (for which 
assessment we need to know what the counterfactuals would be).
In Australia, between January and November 2020, 4,850 COVID-19 related consumer scams 
worth $5.8m were reported to the ACCC’s Scamwatch reporting portal (www.scamwatch.gov.
au). Although representing only 3.3 percent of all scams reported to Scamwatch during this 
period, the reports that mentioned COVID-19 commenced almost immediately following the 
onset of the pandemic in early 2020 (ACCC 2020). Data provided by the ACCC (2020) show the 
substantial increases in COVID-19 related scams reported during 2020, in terms of both 
numbers and dollar losses (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Cumulative number and value of COVID-19 scams reported to Scamwatch, 





















































































































Note: Number and value of reports made to Scamwatch in the calendar years preceding the weeks ending March to 
November 2020 in Australian dollars
Source: Data derived from ACCC 2020
Technology has also facilitated the sale of medical supplies and PPE during the coronavirus 
pandemic in 2020. Australian research has found vendors on the darknet selling PPE and drugs 
marketed as coronavirus vaccines or cures at high costs. In this study, 20 Tor darknet markets 
(not publicly visible—see Broadhurst, Ball & Jiang 2020) were surveyed on 3 April 2020 to 
ascertain the extent of COVID-19 related medical products and supplies. There were 645 
listings, including 222 unique listings, of COVID-19 related products across 12 markets. Three 
markets accounted for 85 percent of all unique listings identified. Of the 110 vendors identified, 
eight were active in multiple markets. A small proportion of vendors accounted for most listings 
and the estimated value of all unique listings was A$369,000. PPE accounted for nearly half of 
all unique listings, and one-third of products were antiviral or repurposed medicines. 
25
Fraud and its relationship to pandemics and economic crises: From Spanish flu to COVID-19
Australian Institute of Criminology
Supposed vaccines, tests and diagnostic instruments each accounted for nearly 10 percent of 
listings. Apart from fraud, details about the origin or composition of vaccines were sparse. 
These products may have been diverted from animal or human trials, or even sourced 
from recovered COVID-19 patients. The median cost of a vaccine was A$575, but vaccines 
offered by three vendors on DarkBay allegedly sourced from China were priced at US$10,000 to 
US$15,000. The most costly vaccine was ‘COVID-19 Antidote for sale’ at A$24,598 on Dream 
Alt, shipped worldwide from the United States (Broadhurst, Ball & Jiang 2020). As the global 
rollout of genuine COVID-19 vaccines continues during 2021, it is likely that various acts of 
dishonesty will occur, including theft of intellectual property, product substitution, and 
procurement and invoicing fraud on governments.
Some scams are not directly related to COVID-19 but are aggravated by remote working risks. 
In the United Kingdom and elsewhere, employees have received emails purporting and 
appearing to be from their managing directors. The message asks the recipient to carry out a 
task and requests their phone number. The recipient then receives a WhatsApp message with a 
convincing profile picture asking them to go to the supermarket to purchase one or more 
Google Play cards and provide the numbers for the cards. Before COVID-19, such requests 
might have been more likely to be questioned. The NCSC (2020) have also warned about an 
Office 365 phishing email. Fraudsters send employees an email pretending to be from their 
organisation’s IT department. It requests that users update the VPN configuration used to 
access the company network while working from home. Users who click the link in the email 
are directed to a fake page that looks identical to a legitimate Office 365 login page.
Payment card fraud and economic crises
While corporate insider and investment frauds and interpersonal scams of different kinds have 
been present for centuries, and certainly throughout the 102-year period of this review, 
particular forms of fraud have become possible only through the development of particular 
technologies, such as payment cards. Before 1974, only store-issued cards were used in 
Australia, with Diners Club and American Express credit cards accessible to the wealthy. In 
1974, the Bankcard was launched by Australian banks who had developed their own card 
network and implemented the technology needed for a nationwide shared facility. By 1976, 
there were 1,054,000 Bankcard holders and almost 49,000 participating merchants. The first 
ATMs began popping up in Australia in 1977, and by 1978 Bankcards could be used across the 
nation for cash withdrawals and purchases (see Smith 1998).
A similar sequence of events occurred in the United Kingdom, with the first credit card being 
issued in 1966 (with limited international interoperability) and the first debit card in 1987. The 
United Kingdom now has one of the most mature payment card markets in the world. Figure 7 
sets out payment types 2009–2019 (European Central Bank 2020; UK Finance 2020b), within 
which payment fraud opportunities take place. In the first half of 2020, losses due to 
unauthorised financial fraud using payment cards, remote banking and cheques decreased 
eight percent, to £374.3m (UK Finance 2020b). 
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Figure 7: Payment types used in the United Kingdom, 2009–19
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Source: Data derived from European Central Bank 2020 and UK Finance 2020b
In Australia, national payment card fraud statistics are published by the Australian Payments 
Network (AusPayNet, formerly known as the Australian Payments Clearing Association; APCA 
(2014) and AusPayNet (2020a)). In the decade surrounding the global financial crisis, payment 
card fraud showed an initial decline followed by an increase once the crisis was largely over. 
Figure 8 shows the rate of fraud on debit, credit and charge cards (as operated by American 
Express, Diners Club International, eftpos Payments Australia, Mastercard and Visa) in terms of 
value (cents per $1,000 in transactions) perpetrated in Australia and overseas on Australian 
issued cards between 2006 and 2019. The sharp decline in payment card fraud was due to the 
introduction of the Card-Not-Present Fraud Mitigation Framework in July 2019, a whole-of-
industry approach to fraud prevention (AusPayNet 2020a).
Figure 8: Rate of fraud on scheme debit, credit and charge cards perpetrated in Australia 
and overseas on Australian issued cards, 2006–19 (cents per $1,000 transactions)










Source: AusPayNet 2020a; Australian Payments Clearing Association 2014
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Here are the trends since the last economic crisis (see Levi & Smith 2011). In the United 
Kingdom, data collected by the not-for-profit fraud prevention service Cifas (2009a, 2009b) 
indicated a rise in identity takeover frauds, as ‘new credit’ became harder to get, generating 
displacement to impersonating existing account holders. Such frauds emerge quite quickly. At 
the end of the third quarter of 2009, Cifas data showed an 11 percent increase in the level of 
fraudulent activity, and a 38 percent upturn in misuse of facility fraud (where an account, policy 
or other facility is used fraudulently) when compared with the same period in 2008. By 2010, a 
decrease in the number of frauds was evident across most fraud types (Cifas 2011).
The most notable was the 23 percent decrease in the number of application frauds on new 
accounts, reflecting both restricted lending by organisations affecting new applications (both 
genuine and fraudulent) and the more stringent lending criteria used by organisations when 
making lending decisions. Cifas (2009b) data reveal that over 59,000 victims of impersonation 
were recorded in the first nine months of 2009—a 36 percent increase from the same period in 
2008. The overall number of identity frauds increased by a third in the first nine months of 
2009 from 2008, with account takeovers rising by 23 percent in 2009 compared with the same 
period in 2008, and by 238 percent in the last 24 months. More than one in two account 
takeovers have targeted victims’ plastic card (ie credit card) accounts, and mobile phone 
account takeovers more than doubled in 2009 from 2008 levels. The one-third rise in identity 
fraud (using other people’s identities) between 2008 and 2009 flattened out in 2010, possibly 
because the industry reacted to the identity fraud boom with better monitoring.
Cifas monitoring shows that the rate of credit fraud recorded by the financial sector was as 
indicated in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Industry-identified credit fraud cases in the United Kingdom, 2009–2018 (n)
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The highest number of cases ever recorded on the National Fraud Database occurred in 2019—
364,643 cases, up 13 percent on 2018. Identity fraud made up 61 percent of total cases, nearly 
a quarter of which involved misuse of facility. A substantial increase in facility takeover and 
cases involving insiders also occurred in 2019 (Cifas 2020). So identity fraud cases rose from 
77,642 cases in 2008 to 223,163 in 2019. The amount of money involved is not available, but 
Table 1 (below) shows no corresponding rise in losses from payment card identity theft over 
this period.
In Australia, trends in identity crime and misuse have been tracked by the Australian Institute 
of Criminology since 2014, with the report for 2018–19 finding direct and indirect costs of 
$3.1b, a 17 percent increase on costs in 2015–16. The top three types of personal information 
most often reported as having been misused in Australia between 2017 and 2019 were names, 
credit/debit card information and bank account information (Franks & Smith 2020). These 
three types of personal information have continued to have the highest ranking since 2013 
(Smith & Hutchings 2014).
Between 2006 and 2009, UK payment card fraud data displayed a number of trends:
• a broad downwards trend in fraud on lost or stolen cards due to the introduction of chip-
and-PIN in Europe;
• a later (2009) drop in counterfeit frauds on skimmed and cloned cards, which previously had 
risen substantially, mainly through being used overseas to sidestep chip-and-PIN controls;
• a slower, modest rise in cards obtained by identity theft; and
• a less easily explained drop in card-not-present frauds over the phone and internet (UK 
Payments 2009).
In concert with the fall in cheque usage, cheque fraud losses fell significantly, while online 
banking fraud losses rose 55 percent to £39m in the first half of 2009—perhaps due to 
improved awareness and reporting, but also reflecting increased phishing for passwords and 
sophisticated cloning of bank websites.
The most recent data on financial fraud in the United Kingdom, for January to July 2020, have 
shown losses due to unauthorised transactions on cards, cheques and remote banking 
declining to £374.3m, down by eight percent on the previous year. The number of recorded 
cases of unauthorised fraudulent transactions rose by one percent to 1.4m. UK Finance 
(2020a: 6) reported:
Total losses due to authorised push payment [APP] scams were £207.8 
million in the first half of 2020, static compared to the same period in 2019. 
The number of cases rose 15 percent to 66,247. Purchase scams form the 
highest volume of APP scams and rose by six percent to 37,516, but it was 
impersonation scams – police/bank scam cases – which saw the biggest 
increase, rising 94 per cent to 8,222.
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In the first half of 2020, during the pandemic, ‘social engineering, in which criminals groom and 
manipulate people into divulging personal or financial details or transferring money, was a key 
driver of both unauthorised and authorised fraud losses’ (UK Finance 2020a: 6) with much of 
this arising from opportunities for deception created by the pandemic. For example:
Criminals may…get in touch claiming to be from an airline or travel agency, 
offering refunds for flights or holidays that have been cancelled due to the 
pandemic. Additionally, criminals are exploiting the growing numbers of 
people working remotely, by posing as IT departments or software providers 
and claiming that payments are needed to fix problems with people’s 
internet connection or broadband. There is sometimes a delay between 
criminals obtaining people’s details through these scams and using them to 
commit fraud. (UK Finance 2020a: 7–8)
In Australia, overall losses on all Australian card types for different crime types are shown in 
Figure 10.
Figure 10: Value of frauds for all Australian payment card types by crime type, 2006–19 
($m)
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019








Source: AusPayNet 2020a; Australian Payments Clearing Association 2014
The value of card-not-present fraud increased considerably, apart from declines in 2012 and 
2019, although as a proportion of the value of all card transactions it has declined since 2015. 
Card-not-present fraud still remains the most prevalent type of fraud on Australian cards but 
declined sharply in 2019 with the introduction of new industry fraud control measures 
(AusPayNet 2020a). The value of fraud involving lost and stolen cards has shown a gradual 
increase since 2006 with no observable change around the time of the global financial crisis, 
but also declined between 2018 and 2019.
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Since 2015–16, however, the value of fraud involving lost and stolen debit cards in which PINs 
were not used increased at a much higher rate than the value of all debit card transactions, 
perhaps due to the increased reliance on contactless debit card transactions over this period 
(Figure 10). This trend is likely to continue during the coronavirus pandemic, as a continuation 
of the trend below (Figure 11).













Debit card fraud PIN not used—lost/stolen ($)           All card transactions ($m)  
Source: AusPayNet 2019
In the United Kingdom, changes in payment card use reflect shifts in criminal skills and also 
crime prevention and policing controls, including the ongoing decline in counterfeit card usage, 
as chip-and-PIN makes card data less useful for criminals, and the huge increase in remote 
purchase frauds through e-commerce is reflected in card-not-present fraud (Table 1).
Table 1: UK issued payment card fraud losses, United Kingdom 2010–19 (£m)




Remote (CNP) 226.9 221 247.3 301 331.5 398.4 432.3 408.4 506.4 470.2 +207
e-commercea (135.1) (139.6) (140.2) (190.1) (219.1) (261.5) (310.3) (310.4) (394.2) (359.3) (+266)
Counterfeit 47.6 36.1 42.3 43.3 47.8 45.7 36.9 24.2 16.3 12.8 –269
Lost & stolen 44.2 50.1 55.4 58.9 59.7 74.1 96.3 92.9 95.1 94.8 +224
Card ID theft 38.1 22.5 32.6 36.7 30.0 38.2 40.0 29.8 47.3 37.7 –1
Card 
non-receipt
8.4 11.3 12.8 10.4 10.1 11.7 12.5 10.2 6.3 5.2 –38
Total 365.2 341 390.4 450.2 479.1 568.1 618.1 565.4 671.4 620.6 +170
UK 271.4 260.9 288.4 328.2 328.7 379.7 417.9 407.5 496.6 449.9 +166
Fraud abroad 93.9 80.0 102.0 122.0 150.3 188.4 200.1 158.0 174.8 170.7 +182
a: Figures in parentheses are the e-commerce losses forming part of CNP totals 
Note: CNP=card-not-present. These figures cover fraud on debit, credit, charge and ATM only cards issued in the UK
Source: UK Finance 2020b
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In the United Kingdom, card fraud losses as a proportion of the amount spent on UK-issued 
cards decreased during 2019, falling from 8.4p per £100 spent in 2018 to 7.5p per £100 in 2019. 
In 2008 it was 12.4p for every £100 spent (UK Finance 2020b), but in the first half of 2020, the 
rate again rose to 8.4p per £100 spent (UK Finance 2020a). The fraud to turnover ratio is almost 
the same at 0.075 as it was in 2010 (0.074), though with fluctuations up and down in between. 
While losses have been decreasing, the number of confirmed cases (ie accounts defrauded, not 
individuals) increased during the same period, rising by five percent to 2,745,539 cases in 2019. 
This reflects quicker detection and stopping of accounts by card issuers, with a lower average 
loss per account defrauded (£381 in 2010, down to £226 in 2019, and £210 in the first six 
months of 2020; UK Finance 2020a).
Comparing the United Kingdom with Australia in 2019, card fraud as a percentage of all card 
spending was 0.075 percent in the United Kingdom and 0.057 percent in Australia. Card fraud 
was 75 percent of all payment fraud in the United Kingdom and 92 percent in Australia, and 
card-not-present fraud was 76 percent of all card fraud in the United Kingdom and 87 percent 
in Australia (AusPayNet 2020a). In both countries, industry initiatives have created a general 
decline in card fraud, making the actual effect of the pandemic difficult to quantify in the 
short-term.
Cash use and pandemics
In most developed countries, cash is being used much less often than in the past. In Australia, 
for example, cash accounted for only 27 percent of consumer payments made in 2019, down 
from 69 percent in 2007 (Caddy et al. 2020). At present, the vast majority of payments are now 
made using cards (9,452m payments on Australian-issued cards worth $767b in 2017–18, 
increasing from 5,871m payments worth $608b in 2012–13). In 2018–19, the number of ATM 
withdrawals in Australia dropped to 577m, 20 percent fewer than in 2014–15 (AusPayNet 
2020b).
In the first half of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic led to reduced reliance on cash in order to limit 
the risk of contracting the virus by handling currency. In some countries, banknotes were 
collected and quarantined due to concern that they might be contaminated with the virus (King 
& Shen 2020). In the United States, the Federal Reserve began quarantining cash repatriated 
from Asia before sending it back into circulation because of contamination risks, while the 
National Reserve Bank of South Africa released a public warning that people purporting to be 
bank representatives had been ‘collecting’ banknotes believed to be ‘contaminated’ with 
coronavirus (Cash Essentials 2020).
To minimise these risks, the use of contactless payment cards has been promoted. In Australia, 
for example, on 8 April 2020, the contactless card payment PIN limit increased from $100 to 
$200 to encourage use of contactless payments (AusPayNet 2020b), and some merchants 
accepted only contactless card payments for all transactions. Examples include petrol outlets, 
local council offices and utilities. Since 2013, the number of both card payments and all 
payments using contactless tap technologies has increased substantially in Australia (Figure 12).
32
Technology as an enabler of fraud during pandemics
Australian Institute of Criminology
Figure 12: Point of sale contactless card payments in Australia as a proportion of all 
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Source: Caddy et al. 2020: 12, based on Reserve Bank of Australia calculations using data from Colmar Brunton, 
Ipsos and Roy Morgan Research
However, many consumers continue to use cash for a variety of reasons. The Reserve Bank of 
Australia’s Consumer Payments Survey in 2019 found that Australians prefer to use cash 
because of merchant acceptance (32%), convenience for small transactions (21%), to aid 
budgeting (15%) and to protect privacy and prevent fraud (8%; Caddy et al. 2020).
Similar trends away from cash and towards tap payments exist in the United Kingdom and in 
Europe as a whole (Thomas & Megaw 2020). In early 2020, ATM transactions during COVID-19 
restrictions were less than half of those of the same period the previous year. Fewer than 10 
percent of those aged over 45 were registered for mobile payments in 2019, but this, alongside 
internet use, has increased among older age groups in 2020. Contactless payments accounted 
for 21 percent of all transactions in 2019 (up from 3 percent in 2015), and these have 
accelerated with the raising of the maximum tap payment from £30 to £45 from 1 April 2020. 
Contactless fraud on payment cards and devices remains low, with £20.6m of fraud losses 
during 2019 compared to spending of £80.5b over the same period. This is equivalent to just 
2.5p in every £100 spent using contactless technology. Contactless fraud on payment cards and 
devices represents 3.3 percent of overall card fraud losses, while 44 percent of all card 
transactions were contactless in 2019. Data on fraud losses during 2020 are not yet available, 
but Mastercard report that during the COVID-19 pandemic, 66 percent of their transactions (by 
volume) were contactless. The financial risks per card from the increased limits for contactless 
payments are managed by occasionally requiring cardholders to input PINs.
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Cash is not only used for legitimate financial transactions but also an important facilitator of 
economic crimes such as money laundering, counterfeiting, welfare and tax fraud and other 
organised criminal activities, most notably drugs and vice (Europol 2006, 2017). Although 
physical currency has long been thought to be the chosen payment channel used by criminals 
owing to its anonymity and inability to be traced, especially in pre-cryptocurrency times (Bell 
2004), information is lacking on the extent to which criminals use cash and how this has 
changed over time. Trends in criminal intelligence are likely to show an increased overall use of 
cash during the pandemic to facilitate economic crime, particularly relating to government 
stimulus eligibility requirements. Hoarding cash, for example, is one way to circumvent 
eligibility requirements for economic stimulus and support payments. Results of the Consumer 
Payments Survey (Caddy et al. 2020) found that cash hoarding accounts for between 10 and 20 
percent of total banknotes in circulation in Australia; however, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
believes this number to be misleading, as those who hoard cash are less likely to participate in 
such surveys (Finlay, Staib & Wakefield 2018). The Currency (Restrictions on the Use of Cash) 
Bill 2019 (Cth), which is currently before the Australian Parliament, was introduced to 
counteract this type of activity.
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In November 2019, a new strain of coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) was identified in Wuhan, Hubei 
Province, China. Since then, this new coronavirus has taken on pandemic status and by 19 
December 2020 affected 215 countries, with 74m confirmed cases and 1.7m deaths (WHO 
2020). In Australia between 22 January and 19 December 2020, there were 28,128 confirmed 
cases and 908 deaths (Department of Health 2020).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia managed to suppress community transmission of the 
virus quite well initially until a number of outbreaks occurred. One of the early outbreaks took 
place in New South Wales in March 2020 when a cruise ship, the Ruby Princess, docked in 
Sydney harbour and allowed its passengers to disembark without adequate virus screening or 
quarantine. A number of passengers and crew were infected and as they entered the 
community the virus spread rapidly. This led the NSW Government to appoint a Special 
Commission of Inquiry to investigate the circumstances surrounding the matter, which reported 
on 14 August 2020 (Special Commission of Inquiry into the Ruby Princess 2020).
Then in Victoria in May 2020, COVID-19 spread from a number of quarantine hotels to the 
community in Melbourne and nearby suburbs. A Board of Inquiry in Victoria was commissioned 
to examine this, with a final report filed on 21 December 2020 (COVID-19 Hotel Quarantine 
Inquiry 2020).
Government responses to these and other outbreaks led to isolation of some sections of cities, 
the imposition of stay-at-home lockdown orders, curfews, mandatory wearing of face masks 
and closure of state borders. Travel bans have also been imposed on both international and 
some internal flights in Australia, and gatherings in public banned with schools and other 
institutions closing for face-to-face activities and with business being conducted online. The 
effect on the economy was considerable, with an expected Australian Government budget 
surplus of $6.1b for 2020–21 being replaced by an underlying cash deficit of $214b for 2020–
21, or 11 percent of GDP (Australian Government 2020).
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Quantifying the problem
The recession in Australia created all the elements needed for economic crime to occur or be 
discovered. As noted above, quantification of the problem is hampered by a number of factors. 
First is the problem of determining the causal relationship between the pandemic and frauds 
that are detected. As in previous pandemics and economic crises, the disruption caused to 
business operations often simply results in existing frauds being uncovered—or, in the words of 
Warren Buffett (2018), ‘You only learn who has been swimming naked when the tide goes 
out—and what we are witnessing at some of our largest financial institutions is an ugly sight.’ 
Although the financial incentives for exposure are weak, as businesses go into receivership and 
liquidation, many pre-existing illegal activities are uncovered and the influence of the pandemic 
is only indirect in allowing them to be identified. This is particularly the case with long-firm 
fraud and frauds that have continued undetected for many years, as often occurs with high-
value economic crimes within organisations (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 2020).
Evidence for this comes from the number of companies in Australia that have entered external 
administration. Figure 13 shows that in the 12 months to 12 July 2020, the numbers decreased 
by 12 percent on a 12-month rolling average (apart from controller appointments, which 
increased slightly). This indicates that many companies that normally would have failed are 
being artificially supported by government payments. Similar patterns exist in the United 
Kingdom, for similar reasons, and we can expect large rises in businesses entering 
administration following the diminution or ending of such payments. Although not necessarily 
indicative of fraud, there is the possibility that some corporate failures may have occurred 
through phoenix activity, which continues to exist in Australia and Europe, despite various 
initiatives being used to minimise risks of this kind (eg Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 2020a). 
Concern has been expressed in the United Kingdom about the potential abuse of pre-pack 
administration to enable directors to repurchase the assets from their businesses cheaply and 
walk away from their corporate debts.
Figure 13: Australian companies entering external administration, 12 July 2019 to 
12 July 2020 (n)

















Source: Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2020 (Chart 1B.3)
36
Fraud arising from COVID-19
Australian Institute of Criminology
The second difficulty in quantifying fraud arising from pandemics and economic shocks is that 
fraud often takes many years to discover, and even longer for allegations to be investigated by 
police, dealt with in the courts (whose proceedings are delayed in times of pandemics), and 
appear in official statistics of recorded crime or convictions (if ever). For these reasons, other 
sources of data need to be relied on including consumer complaints, and victimisation surveys. 
Interestingly, as noted above, in Australia, government agencies have embarked on a number 
of monitoring programs, not only to document the spread of the virus but also to document 
reports of pandemic-related consumer scams, false advertising and other forms of illegality 
(ACCC 2020). 
For example, the ATO indicated in July 2020 that 3,000 staff were reviewing applications for 
JobKeeper and other COVID-19 stimulus measures including auditing and data-matching to 
detect fraudulent payments (Khadem 2020). Equivalent numbers of extra staff are unavailable 
in the United Kingdom (or the United States), but the National Cyber Security Centre, the City 
of London Police, the National Economic Crime Centre, UK Finance and the Cabinet Office 
Counter-Fraud teams as well as the Fraud Advisory Panel have been actively involved in 
monitoring and advising consumers and others how to avoid COVID-19 fraud victimisation in 
the United Kingdom. The UK National Audit Office and the US General Accounting Office have 
already issued reports noting the fraud implications of hasty government spending programs 
with inadequate due diligence on suppliers and borrowers (see, for example, National Audit 
Office 2020a, 2020b). 
The National Audit Office warned that UK taxpayers could lose £15b to £26b from fraud, 
organised crime or default on the Bounce-Back Loans scheme alone, and Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) suggested that up to 10 percent of the money delivered by the 
scheme to mid-August, or £3.5b, may have been paid out in fraud or error (Public Accounts 
Committee 2020). HMRC’s fraud hotline had received over 10,000 reports by November 2020 
and the UK National Audit Office (2020b) found that 9 percent of people it surveyed admitted 
to working in lockdown at the request of their employer, and against the rules of the scheme. 
HMRC planned to tackle fraud through whistleblowing and retrospective compliance work. 
However, employees would not have known if their employer was part of the furlough scheme 
unless their employer had informed them. HMRC intends to publish the names of employers 
claiming the new Job Support Scheme and to notify employees through their personal tax 
accounts when an employer has claimed job support. Setting aside the difficulty of 
distinguishing fraud from mistakes, the eventual net losses in both jurisdictions will depend 
upon the capacity of the revenue agencies, insolvency practitioners and the criminal justice 
system to recuperate the gross losses via tax demands, civil claims and proceeds of 
crime confiscation.
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Economic stimulus fraud
Some types of fraud have a clear, causal relationship to the onset of the pandemic and the 
associated economic crisis. In Australia and the United Kingdom, the clearest examples of this 
relate to dishonest attempts to obtain government economic stimulus funding, and payments 
made to support individuals who have lost jobs or property during the pandemic or, in 
Australia’s case, natural disasters such as the bushfires in 2019–20 (Fowler 2020).
Stimulus payment fraud in Australia
In Australia, the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a substantial increase in government-funded 
support payments being made. The Coronavirus Economic Response Package Omnibus Act 
2020 (Cth), which contains 16 schedules of support measures, was developed to address the 
significant economic consequences for businesses and individuals arising from the COVID-19 
pandemic (Treasury 2020a). Such measures include the JobKeeper program, which allows 
businesses to retain staff and pay them a base salary if they meet certain criteria; the 
JobSeeker program, which provides increased payments to individuals looking for employment; 
and various tax relief measures for small and medium businesses designed to ease the 
economic burden created by the pandemic. Because of the substantial value of these 
programs, some individuals and corporations have sought to defraud the government in a 
variety of ways. On 1 May 2020, the ATO (2020b) issued compliance guidelines in relation to 
schemes involving JobKeeper payments. Designed to assist taxpayers, the guidelines gave 
details of eight scenarios in which the JobKeeper payment scheme could be compromised, 
some entailing complex dishonest activities.
In 2020, 24 allegations of fraud involving pandemic stimulus payments were referred to the 
Australian Federal Police. In two cases, those accused were charged with fraudulently claiming 
$27,000 using 25 assumed identities (Box 3). In other cases, businesses have registered for 
JobKeeper payments but illegally withheld a proportion of the funds from their employees 
(Palmer-Derrien 2020). Although not dishonest, many individuals have also received salary 
supplements from the government in amounts that exceeded the salaries they had been 
receiving prior to the pandemic. These payments have been justified as a consequence of the 
speed with which support payments were made and the fact that any additional payments 
would, nonetheless, assist the Australian economy generally. Following a review of the support 
payment programs, additional measures are being taken to ensure that payments are made to 
those most in need of support.
38
Fraud arising from COVID-19
Australian Institute of Criminology
Box 3: Case studies of economic stimulus payment fraud in Australia
Two women in Port Macquarie, New South Wales were charged with fraudulently obtaining 
more than $27,000 in COVID-19 JobSeeker and bushfire recovery assistance payments. The 
two women had already obtained $10,000 and had made claims for a further $17,000. The 
alleged frauds were uncovered when Services Australia (formerly the Department of Human 
Services) identified a pattern of suspicious activity and referred the matter to the Australian 
Federal Police. The allegations included 25 fraudulent claims for the Australian Government 
Disaster Recovery Payment made following the 2019–20 bushfires. Each woman was 
charged with eight counts of obtaining a financial advantage by deception.
In another case, Australian Federal Police arrested a Western Sydney man who allegedly 
assumed 53 fictitious identities in order to make 65 fraudulent claims for bushfire recovery 
payments and JobSeeker payments. They charged him with several offences including 
obtaining a financial advantage by deception.
Source: Services Australia 2020; Sutton 2020
Again, such opportunistic frauds started soon after the pandemic began, with some complex 
and elaborate strategies used to obtain funds illegally. Two of the largest government support 
programs, JobKeeper and JobSeeker, have created opportunities for ineligible individuals and 
businesses to defraud these schemes, with the ATO rejecting 6,500 applications for JobKeeper 
payments alone due to fraud or error (Treasury 2020a, 2020b).
Another government initiative enabled individuals to withdraw up to $20,000 over two months 
from personal superannuation savings, which are normally preserved until retirement age. 
Following the introduction of this economic stimulus measure, designed to support those who 
had lost jobs, some $30b was withdrawn, representing one percent of all Australian 
superannuation holdings. A proportion of this was provided to individuals who had dishonestly 
made claims outside the strict eligibility requirements, or to individuals who sought to steal 
funds by making unauthorised applications for early release payments from other members’ 
accounts without their knowledge or permission (Box 4). The ATO and Australian Federal Police 
are aware of at least 150 cases of COVID-19 related identity fraud, in which individuals 
allegedly attempted to obtain early access to superannuation funds fraudulently 
(Roddan 2020).
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Box 4: Case study of alleged fraud involving early access to superannuation funds
In late May 2020, a Perth woman was charged with allegedly submitting multiple false claims 
to gain early access to superannuation (Sutton 2020). Police alleged that the woman 
submitted several false hardship claims on behalf of other people to access superannuation 
payments of $10,000 each. The case was detected by the joint Australian Federal Police and 
Department of Human Services (now Services Australia) Taskforce Iris, which was formed in 
July 2019 to investigate serious welfare non-compliance and criminal activity in connection 
with bushfire benefit payments (Services Australia 2019). Taskforce Iris investigators ‘seized 
several documents, $1,750 cash, ink-based business identification and certification stamps, 
and electronic devices’ as part of the investigation (Hickey 2020: np).
In August 2020, the Australian Federal Police charged three Queensland women with 
allegedly trying to defraud the Australian government’s early access to superannuation 
scheme of more than $113,000 by submitting false claims to gain access to other people’s 
superannuation holdings (Swanston 2020).
Sources: Hickey 2020; Services Australia 2019; Sutton 2020; Swanston 2020
A third source of support payments enabled small businesses and not-for-profit organisations 
to claim between $20,000 and $100,000 as a cash flow boost to help them maintain operations 
during the pandemic. Again, some payments were made to those outside the eligibility rules.
Stimulus payment fraud in the United Kingdom
At the time of writing, the United Kingdom has not published data on the extent of COVID-19 
stimulus fraud.
In the United Kingdom, stimulus programs include the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme and 
Bounce Back Loan Scheme for businesses. The Job Retention (Furlough) Scheme was 
introduced to protect jobs and to help employers and families through the pandemic, with the 
government agreeing to pay up to 80 percent of people’s wages to a maximum of £2,500 a 
month. The scheme was extended to the end of April 2021 and by December 2020 provided 
approximately £20b in respect of 10m jobs. Workers covered by the scheme were not, 
however, permitted to work for their employer while on the scheme (Tew 2020; Welford 2020). 
The government created a fraud reporting line to detect cases of fraud and error, and by 11 
August 2020, 7,791 reports of alleged fraud had been made to the government (Rodger 2020), 
rising later (National Audit Office 2020b). This is, however, based largely on anecdotal evidence 
to date, and there continues to be potential for employers to pressure furloughed employees 
to work for them covertly without pay or for only partial payment, since the government was 
paying most of their salaries.
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In addition to the Job Retention Scheme, the UK government provided so-called Bounce Back 
Loans that enable eligible business to apply for a 100 percent, state-backed loan of up to 
£50,000 per business, with no interest charged or repayments due during the first 12 months. 
By August 2020, more than 1.5m businesses had borrowed up to £50,000 each, worth a total 
of £35b. By 16 August 2020, the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme approved 
£13.6b in expenditure; the Coronavirus Large Business Interruption Loan Scheme approved 
£3.5b; and the Bounce Back Loan Scheme, £35.47b (HM Treasury 2020).
It has been alleged that loans have been provided with inadequate due diligence by banks and 
that some businesses have sought to use funds for non-business purposes. Loans are also 
thought to have been provided to dormant or illegitimate businesses that are likely never to 
make repayments, and multiple payments made to the same applicant. Fraudsters have taken 
over business premises which were or are unoccupied. The fraudster targets these empty 
properties using a recently set up company for the purpose of making a grant claim and 
provides false lease agreements (containing the correct landlord details), utility bills and 
bank statements.
The scale of the fraud remains to be quantified and will only become apparent once the time 
for repayment begins (Cahill 2020; Sproson 2020). HM Treasury rejected a Fraud Advisory Panel 
proposal requesting that the government increase transparency around the Bounce Back Loans 
and Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Schemes by publishing the names of all companies 
that have received the loans. Although not yet quantified, the scale of fraud and error involved 
in these programs, in both Australia and the United Kingdom, is costly. The expenditure could, 
however, be justified on the basis that stimulus had to be provided immediately, and that the 
funds provided would nonetheless assist the national economic recovery despite being 
provided outside the eligibility rules. Most of the media and political pressures to date have 
been on the non-provision or delayed provision of aid to needy businesses and individuals 
rather than on fraud risk reduction, though it is reasonable to anticipate that individual cases of 
abuse and alleged procurement corruption will receive significant attention when published, as 






Levi and Smith (2011) explored some of the explanations underlying economic crime in 
connection with the global financial crisis in 2008–09 applying Clarke’s (2012) opportunity 
theory approach. Although this theory cannot account for all aspects of the current pandemic, 
it is reasonable to conclude that government stimulus packages have created numerous 
opportunities for individuals to commit economic crimes. As was the case in the global 
financial crisis, some economic support measures were introduced quickly with inadequate 
fraud controls, creating sometimes simple ways in which to obtain payments from 
governments dishonestly or in breach of eligibility criteria. Some who committed such frauds 
may have been motivated by need arising from loss of employment, or a desire to keep 
businesses trading until economies improve. Others, including members of organised crime 
groups, saw the lack of fraud controls as a way to obtain wealth using often sophisticated 
strategies designed to avoid detection and prosecution.
Rationalisations and coping mechanisms
This report has not specifically analysed, first-hand, the motivations of fraud offenders, 
although it is clear from the above that coronavirus fraudsters are motivated by a mixture of 
economic need, created by a decline in business activity and loss of jobs, and personal greed 
driven by apparent opportunities to gain access to government support payments during a 
time of a perceived reduction in fraud controls. Nonetheless, some broader context 
appears worthwhile.
Understanding pandemic-related fraud
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One of the principal components of the ‘fraud triangle’ and its variants as a framework for 
understanding fraud offending in organisations is the capacity of individuals to rationalise their 
conduct based on personal attitudes and situational pressures (Andon & Free 2020; Schuchter 
& Levi 2015). The 2020 pandemic, being global in its reach and causing widespread economic 
as well as health consequences, has created many rationalisations for fraud, including almost 
all of Sykes and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralisation:
• denial of authorship—‘I’m acting on behalf of others, perhaps under duress or coercion’;
• sharing responsibility—‘Everyone’s doing it—the government can afford it and the funds 
taken will be spent, thus supporting the economy’;
• external influences—actions are caused or necessitated by the pandemic, thus reducing 
personal responsibility;
• denial of injury—the conduct was designed to keep an organisation afloat and the funds will 
be repaid when the economy improves;
• denial of illegality—where eligibility for stimulus measures is unclear, the conduct may be 
seen as not technically illegal;
• denial of culpability—dissatisfaction with current or expected future employment situation 
or reasons for job loss may be seen to reduce culpability, especially where the unpunished 
misconduct of senior personnel can be pointed to as a negative role model; and
• appeal to higher loyalties—laws can be ignored due to higher duties owed to family and 
friends during the pandemic.
One of the most frequently relied on rationalisations for organisational fraud is the need to 
support a failing business to save employees’ jobs and to maintain cash flow in the economy. 
During the pandemic, governments promoted this by providing payments to support 
businesses facing closure due to lack of consumer demand, such as the Australian JobKeeper 
payments. Business proprietors could therefore argue that their desire to support the economy 
was the main reason for acting dishonestly, and that even if funding was obtained 
inappropriately it nonetheless helped to stimulate the overall economy. Evidence supporting 
this argument comes from Ernst & Young (2016) in its 14th global fraud survey, which found 
that 36 percent of chief financial officers surveyed would rationalise unethical conduct in order 
to improve the financial performance of the organisation.
Such rationalisations, Andon and Free (2020) argue, apply most often to ‘a static phenomenon 
involved in the initial decision to offend’ rather than to continuing patterns of dishonesty. Using 
data from interviews with individuals convicted of serious fraud offences in Australia, Andon 
and Free (2020) identified a number of strategies that were used to cope psychologically with 
the strain of ongoing fraudulent conduct: problem-focused, emotion-focused and 
social-focused coping strategies. As the pandemic continues—perhaps for years, continuously 
or intermittently—such coping strategies are likely to become apparent, once the immediate 
need to act illegally dissipates. Although the rationalisations noted above may have been 
present during the initial decision to commit fraud at the beginning of the pandemic, it is likely 
that coping strategies will take their place to remove or lessen the strain and psychological 
stress caused by ongoing fraudulent behaviour.
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Capable guardianship
In addition to considering opportunity- and rationalisation-based elements of situational crime 
prevention, the absence of capable guardians is also relevant to the current pandemic. 
Guardians can act as an inhibiting factor in the decision to act illegally and/or to continue to do 
so, and their effective absence can provide an additional stimulus for acting dishonestly. During 
the pandemic, law enforcement priorities have shifted away from conventional policing to 
community support roles. For example, police have been directed to guard virus hotspots and 
issue fines to people breaching social distancing orders, leaving less time for conventional 
policing—particularly of economic crime. In addition, the complexities of new laws introduced 
to control the pandemic and to stimulate the economy make policing of economic crime in 
these times demanding.
Even during more stable economic times, resources for policing economic crime are stretched, 
but during pandemics the chances of detecting and seriously investigating fraud are limited. In 
Australia, although the ATO has made use of data matching and artificial intelligence systems to 
monitor stimulus payments (Hendry 2020a, 2020b), law enforcement action has been limited, 
with few prosecutions arising. Over time, as the scale of fraud and error increases, it is likely 
that more resources will be devoted to official action—even if the courts are unable to deal 
with the backlog of cases awaiting hearing, and the need to use virtual courtrooms.
In the United Kingdom, there have been regular and ongoing criticisms of counter-fraud 
strategies and policing efforts at national and local levels (Doig & Levi 2020; HM Inspectorate of 
Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services 2019; Levi & Doig 2020). Although COVID-19 has 
stimulated strong efforts at intelligence-sharing and fraud reduction, and freed some police 
resources for increased arrests for high vulnerability offences such as courier fraud, 
overstretched resources at police and HMRC mean that only a modest number of strategically 
selected and opportunistic arrests can be made, now and plausibly in the future, when the 
extent of fraudulent and other losses on ‘loans’ becomes clearer. As in Australia, UK courts 
have large backlogs, partly due to the impact of social distancing measures on court attendance 
during the pandemic, and there are processing difficulties that inevitably increase the delay 
between offence commission and possible justice outcomes. As Levi et al. (2017) and Dupont 
(2019) argue in the case of cyber-enabled frauds, where the capacity for pursuing crime is 
limited, a systematic focus on resilience and prevention is vital.
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Larger corporations and consultancies handling a lot of sensitive data have implemented 
systematic security processes for remote working (especially as this is now seen as a long-term 
practice), but relatively low-cost persistent efforts at business email compromise, data 
breaches, and ransomware have abounded in recent years, and prevention efforts need to be 
disciplined at all times to be effective. In the United Kingdom, the National Cyber Security 
Centre has enhanced a suite of prevention advice and reporting mechanisms for individuals 
and business. UK Finance, individual banks, and cross-sectoral bodies such as Cifas have 
enhanced their intelligence and confirmation of payee processes to make diversion frauds 
harder. Newspapers and consumer programs on radio and television, however, testify to the 
incompleteness and imperfection of these processes, as well as to inconsistencies in victim 
compensation (Cavaglieri 2020; UK Finance 2020b). In public-facing, inter-business, and intra-
public sector areas, liaison and information sharing efforts have expanded as part of the 
reaction to expected increases in fraud during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Another form of guardianship that has taken on importance in preventing and uncovering fraud 
during pandemics is that of natural surveillance. Individuals in workplaces or in the community 
generally are often able to detect behavioural anomalies that could indicate fraud and report 
them to the authorities. In a time of crisis, the need for communities to act collaboratively 
means reporting suspected illegality may be more likely to occur than in more settled times. In 
the United States, for example, whistleblowers who report suspected fraud against 
government-funded programs can receive incentive payments. Recently, they have been 
alerted to the possibility of taking action and have reported COVID-19 related fraud under the 
US False Claims Act (31 USC ss 3729–33). This has occurred in cases of conspicuous spending of 
government-funded Paycheck Protection Program payments on lifestyle goods and services, 
gambling and cryptocurrencies (Johnson 2020). In the United Kingdom, many thousands of 
workers have reported suspected fraud by their employers relating to the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme, as noted above (Welford 2020). In one case, a man was arrested in relation 
to a suspected Job Retention Scheme fraud involving £495,000 (Tew 2020).
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What has been learnt from the past
This report has reviewed the drivers and consequences of a number of pandemics and financial 
crises that have occurred since the First World War, commencing with the Spanish flu in 
1918–19 and ending with the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. On each occasion, the crisis was 
preceded by indicators that usually went unheeded or the response was delayed until the scale 
of the problem became obvious and containment invariably difficult to achieve. Although 
response measures of varying degrees of utility were adopted during and following each crisis, 
formal evaluation of these measures was rarely undertaken. This led to less than satisfactory 
preventive strategies being developed and adopted to deal with similar events in the future. Of 
course, it could be argued that problems arising from natural disasters and pandemics on this 
scale can never be prevented. However, some of the consequences of these events recur 
following each event and if knowledge of the past had been used effectively, some of the 
harms could have been avoided. Preventing some if not all fraud is an obvious case in point.
One recurring theme is the focus of the present study—the tendency of individuals and 
organisations to act dishonestly to compromise controls on government-funded recovery and 
support programs for immediate gain. Although empirical evidence is limited, anecdotal 
accounts are available to document the presence of fraud during and following each of these 
global events that not only prevented fair distribution of limited resources to the affected 
communities, but also exacerbated the economic harm to communities globally.
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The Australian economy has been affected to varying degrees by each of the pandemics and 
economic crises described above, and, like other nation states, Australia has learnt the lessons 
of the past only to a limited extent. The fact that Australia has suffered lower levels of health 
and economic consequences from each of the global crises than other developed Western 
nations has been due more to its geographical isolation, general financial stability, relatively 
small population and stable government than to any other factors. Despite these protective 
factors, the economic recovery following each crisis took at least a decade to occur. Some of 
the consequences of these crises for Australia are described below.
Spanish flu 1918–19
As in the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, risks of infection from the Spanish flu arose in Australia 
initially from maritime arrivals that were, at that time, the only way in which individuals could 
enter the country. Responses from each of the states and territories were, in 1919, poorly 
coordinated, leading to quarantine regimes differing across jurisdictions. Governments 
subsequently identified this as a concern, by governments leading to the establishment of the 
Commonwealth Department of Health in 1921.
In 2020, each of the Australian states and territories responded differently to the infection risks 
they faced from COVID-19, with some closing borders sooner rather than later, and others 
having inadequate measures in place to prevent the spread of infections in specific 
communities and locations.
The fraud risk arising from the pandemic generally affected Commonwealth interests, although 
the cross-border movement of people created difficulties for policing and enforcement. Many 
issues that arose in the current pandemic were similar to those experienced in 1919 (see 
Bongiorno 2020; McQueen 1976), particularly the limitations of Australia’s federal system of 
government and the difficulties of monitoring movements across borders—despite attempts to 
use digital tracking solutions that were unavailable in 1919.
Second World War, 1939–1945
In Australia during the Second World War, rates of fraud declined because large numbers of 
men took on war service, which made them unavailable to exploit local opportunities to 
commit fraud. On their return to civilian life following the war, rates of reported fraud rose as 
the economic consequences of wartime were felt by the workforce and as opportunities arose 
when the economy began to improve.
One area of economic crime that was enabled by wartime related to profiteering and price 
gouging in connection with food, medicines and commodities in the Australian community. 
Although this resulted in some prosecutions, regulation was generally inadequate. In 2020, 
during the COVID-19 pandemic, profiteering once again occurred during lockdowns, for 
products in high demand—face masks, hand sanitiser, toilet paper—as those in affected 
communities feared loss of supplies and an anticipated inability to obtain necessary goods 
when confined to homes and suburbs, despite having access to online shopping. Once again, 
the lessons learnt about postwar restrictions had been forgotten, or were unknown to 
Australians 75 years later.
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Global financial crisis, 2008–09
The Australian Government acted quickly during and after the global financial crisis in 2008–09 
to create a range of stimulus measures including a school building program, home insulation 
scheme and a solar, green energy and water renovation plan. These were, arguably, 
implemented too quickly, leading to wasted resources and some unsafe practices 
implemented. The economic stimulus, however, prevented the Australian economy from 
deteriorating as much as in other countries, with unemployment reaching only five percent 
following the crisis, the average for the whole twentieth century.
In 2020, the Australian Government’s stimulus packages were introduced more slowly than 
those following the 2008–09 crisis, but wastage was still present despite efforts being taken to 
deter and prevent fraud from occurring. However, the economic harm of the pandemic in 2020 
was far greater than that of any other crisis that affected Australia, although it remains to be 
seen exactly how much coronavirus-related fraud cost the economy. By mid-2020, the 
unemployment rate in Australia was 7.5 percent, similar to the rate shortly after the turn of the 
twentieth century and also during the Asian financial crisis in the early 1990s (11%), but less 
than the 20 percent seen during the Great Depression (ABS 2020).
Australian bushfires, 2019–20
In Australia, natural disasters, especially bushfires, have occurred regularly and with increasing 
severity due to the changing climate. The most recent bushfires in late 2019 and early 2020, 
occurred just prior to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, making it difficult to disaggregate 
the effects of these two crises. Governments provided immediate and extensive support to 
those who had lost loved ones, homes and businesses during the bushfires (Fowler 2020), and 
difficulties were experienced in identifying victims whose personal identification records had 
been destroyed. This provided opportunities for fraud, as well as a range of insurance, charity 
and consumer scams associated with relief packages (Cross 2020).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, identity misuse once again occurred, with a number of 
fraudulent claims for support payments being made using false or fabricated identity 
credentials. Technological solutions to control fraud were heavily relied on in both the bushfires 
and the coronavirus pandemic but found to be wanting due to community concerns regarding 
security of personal information and some technological problems.
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The cost of pandemics
As we have seen from this brief review of some of the global economic shocks and pandemics 
since the Spanish flu, there is little information available on the cost of fraud and economic 
crime arising from these events. Some data are available on the economic impact and effects 
on employment and the extent of government deficits, but quantification of the cost of fraud 
and dishonesty associated with these events remains scant. The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 is, 
however, unique in that advances in information and communications technologies have 
enabled business and government datasets to be monitored and mined to see how some types 
of economic crime changed over the duration of the pandemic. Moreover, there has been 
more systematic and public concern about fraud and online scams affecting the community 
from the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Monitoring of fraud trends is not, however, as 
mature as monitoring of infection rates and deaths caused by the COVID-19 virus, although the 
extent of baseline information on the impact of fraud is much better than in respect of any 
previous global event. As such, some data relevant to changes in the prevalence of fraud now 
exist, albeit in sometimes overly general form.
Although the precise extent of fraud arising from the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 will not be 
known for some time—indeed, a proportion of this fraud may never be identified or quantified, 
depending on the risk appetite and tolerance of governments—it is clear that the fiscal and 
social changes that have taken place have created abundant opportunities for acts of 
dishonesty and fraud to occur. Whether the financial benefits of prompt implementation of 
stimulus and support measures outweigh the risks of financial crime remains to be seen. It is 
likely, however, that a proportion of the many billions of dollars (and pounds) at stake will be 
lost to fraud.
What is surprising is that during the first nine months of the current pandemic, identified fraud 
has been relatively low. Losses due to identified government stimulus fraud, consumer scams 
and payment fraud have accounted for millions rather than billions. Arguably, many individuals 
and businesses might not have experienced the full economic impact of COVID-19 during 2020, 
having been supported by personal savings and government support programs. As the full 
impact of the pandemic is felt, it is likely that the cost of fraud will increase considerably.
Best practice in preventing fraud in future pandemics and 
economic crises
Bearing these limitations in mind, in what ways can governments, business and the community 
take action to minimise the risks of economic crime and fraud during pandemics and economic 
crises? Some solutions are well known, already in use, but not fully implemented, while others 
remain to be developed. The following are some examples of best practice initiatives that could 
be adopted to minimise risk of fraud in future economic crises and pandemics.
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Establishing national fraud controls
Ongoing reviews need to be undertaken of national fraud control systems to ensure that they 
remain fit-for-purpose during times of economic shocks and pandemics. The lessons for fraud 
control that have been learnt during previous crises need to be understood and taken into 
account as fraud risk assessments are undertaken and fraud control plans revised. In Australia, 
the Commonwealth Fraud Prevention Centre (Attorney-General’s Department 2020) has 
monitored fraud risks for the Commonwealth. In addition, the Australian Institute of 
Criminology’s annual Fraud against the Commonwealth Census required respondent entities in 
September 2020 to indicate how their fraud controls have changed in response to the risks 
uncovered during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results of this census should be used alongside 
reviews of actual fraud levels to develop appropriate fraud control measures for the years 
ahead. The Commonwealth Fraud Prevention Centre (2020) also provides guidance on counter-
fraud activities recommended for entities during the pandemic.
In the United Kingdom, the government released its functional standard on countering fraud in 
October 2018, which sets out the expectations for the management of fraud, bribery and 
corruption risk in government organisations. As of February 2020, 123 public bodies had 
adopted the standard (Cabinet Office 2020), though the standard is not self-implementing. 
Dealing with the specific risk of fraud arising from the COVID-19 pandemic, specific guidance 
has been provided on how to respond to threats, particularly of misrepresentation when 
applying for government grants and third parties impersonating businesses to obtain grant 
funding. Specific principles for effective fraud control in response to pandemic threats are 
outlined, including using fraud risk assessments, having consistent data management systems 
in place, ensuring that funds paid incorrectly can be recovered, identifying applicants 
effectively, using cross-entity data-matching tools, and developing post-event assurance 
processes (Government Counter Fraud Function 2020).
In addition, ongoing national pandemic planning exercises by government disaster 
management entities need to include risks of economic crime and fraud as part of the response 
measures needed to deal with pandemics. Too often, fraud risk assessments only occur after a 
disaster, once many incidents of fraud have been detected and assessed—sometimes a 
considerable time after the event. A comprehensive plan to prepare for a disaster should 
include predicting the likely fraud and economic crime risks that will arise, based on previous 
experience, and developing control measures to ensure that these risks are addressed prior to 
the crisis occurring.
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Monitoring fraud risks
It is also important to have adequate fraud monitoring and testing programs in place that are 
of sufficient granularity to detect new instances of fraud during a pandemic, as soon as they 
arise. In the United Kingdom, police recorded crime statistics show a five percent reduction in 
the number of all crimes between February and March 2020. Comparisons between April 2019 
and April 2020 showed that fraud and computer misuse crimes fell by 16 percent. Experimental 
statistics were also published of the Telephone-operated Crime Survey for England and Wales. 
Comparisons between the United Kingdom’s lockdown period of April and May 2020 and the 
preceding two months showed an eight percent decline in fraud (686,000 to 632,000 incidents) 
and a 57 percent increase in computer misuse (299,000 to 468,000 incidents; Office of National 
Statistics 2020).
One of the features of the coronavirus pandemic was the quick action taken by fraudsters to 
exploit opportunities created by the pandemic. Consumer scams using COVID-19 scenarios 
were developed as soon as the virus became apparent—though there is no evidence yet that 
these led to a net increase in such consumer scams—and frauds targeting government relief 
and stimulus programs also began as soon as these programs were implemented. This was 
partially because of the necessity for some individuals and businesses to support their failing 
financial positions by securing alternative sources of funding, but also because of the 
complexity of eligibility rules, which changed rapidly and were poorly administered in some 
jurisdictions. Having effective real-time monitoring of fraud trends is essential to limit the 
extent to which opportunities for fraud are exploited. Reducing the scale of frauds and the 
amount of time available to spend or squirrel away the proceeds is important, even if the 
number of frauds is not reduced.
Enhancing technology
Technological solutions to fraud control also need to be developed and implemented prior to 
pandemics taking hold. Although primarily introduced as a health measure, in both Australia 
and the United Kingdom, contact-tracing applications were developed, but were not suitable 
for all smartphone systems and, more importantly, take-up by the community was less than 
needed owing to concerns over data confidentiality and function creep. Use of the app data for 
fraud control could, arguably, be one of the types of function creep that citizens feared.
In connection with fraud control, extensive data-matching using artificial intelligence 
algorithms was undertaken by the Australian Government in order to detect fraud and error in 
connection with pandemic relief and economic stimulus programs. The ATO indicated in July 
2020 that 3,000 staff were doing ongoing reviews of JobKeeper and other stimulus payment 
applications to ensure that applicants were adhering to eligibility rules. By July 2020, 6,500 
applications for JobKeeper support payments had been rejected for suspected fraud or error 
(Khadem 2020).
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Responding to rationalisations
Governments and business also need to address the various neutralisation techniques and 
coping strategies individuals use to justify their dishonest behaviour. One of Clarke’s (1997) 
opportunity-reducing techniques of situational crime prevention is to remove excuses for 
acting illegally. This can be achieved in four ways that have direct relevance to the prevention 
of fraud during pandemics. Firstly, clear rules need to be in place to ensure that people who 
may be likely to act dishonestly know precisely what lawful conduct entails. During pandemics, 
when stimulus payments are often implemented quickly, individuals are often unclear about 
their obligations, such as eligibility for claiming funds from governments. Conflicting rules 
across jurisdictions also should be avoided, particularly in a country with a federal system such 
as Australia.
Secondly, governments could emphasise the social utility of adhering to rules and could make 
clear the moral obligation or social contract that obliges members of the community not to act 
fraudulently for personal gain, such that others in the community would be disadvantaged. In 
terms of tertiary crime prevention using the criminal justice system, public shaming undertaken 
in a reintegrative way (Braithwaite 1989) could have potential benefits for minimising 
recidivism (Levi 2002). Thirdly, technological solutions could also be used to control 
disinhibiting factors. In the case of fraud control, making dishonest payments impossible or 
detecting them quickly through the use of data analytic methods is one viable option.
Finally, helping those in the community to achieve compliance would prevent rationalisations 
based on arguments such as ‘I didn’t know that what I was doing was illegal’ or ‘The eligibility 
rules were too complicated to understand.’
Learning from the past
Finally, we need to learn from previous economic shocks and pandemics. Ideally, the nature 
and extent of fraud that occurred in previous crises need to be documented and understood so 
that similar risks can be avoided in the future. Although each crisis has its own unique 
characteristics, there are many common themes and risks that fraudsters can exploit. Ensuring 
that these are identified and counter measures implemented in advance of new crises could 
result in considerable savings for governments and the community—arguably, easily off-setting 
the predicted costs of fraud that are likely to be experienced. Similarly, ensuring that fraud 
control plans and fraud risk assessments are regularly revisited will help to guard against many 
of the conventional fraud risks that are likely to occur. In addition, efforts need to be made to 
evaluate historical fraud control measures that have previously been tried to determine how 
successful they were in limiting fraud risks and reducing overall losses. Building fraud control 
into future pandemic planning policies and activities will go a long way to ensuring that 
communities, businesses and governments are not taken by surprise when the next pandemic 
takes hold. As Louis Pasteur noted in a lecture in 1854, ‘In the fields of observation, chance 
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